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Abstract 
This dissertation contains three chapters. Below are the individual abstracts for each 
chapter. 
Chapter 1: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Debtholders: Evidence from CDS 
Spread Response to Shareholders’ Votes 
This chapter provides causal estimates in support of the hypothesis that improvements in 
corporate governance benefit the debtholders. By using the outcome of votes on shareholder-
sponsored governance proposals at annual meetings we find that passing a proposal that 
increases shareholder rights reduces the firm’s default risk as measured by adjusted CDS 
spreads. Exploiting the discontinuity in the vote outcome around the majority threshold, we 
find that passing a governance proposal lowers the cumulative adjusted CDS spreads by about 
6 bps in a two-day window around the voting date. We find that CDS market reaction is larger 
in the case of non-G-Index related provisions and for non-investment grade ﬁrms. Moreover, 
consistent with the short-run market reaction, the firm credit rating improves on average by 
about half a notch in two years after the voting, further supporting the hypothesis in the long-
term. 
Chapter 2: Local Capital Market and Small Firm Liquidity Management 
This chapter studies the effect of local bank deposit on the liquidity management of local 
companies. Local companies save less cash when there is more local bank deposit, but they do 
not have access to more credit line. Hence, the results do not support the hypotheses that 
companies have access to credit line easier if they are in an area with more local bank deposit. 
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Chapter 3: Loan Sales and Bank Liquidity Risk Management: Evidence from the Shared 
National Credit Program 
This chapter investigates the impact of commercial banks’ liquidity risk management on 
bank loan sales. We track the dynamics of bank loan share ownership in the secondary market 
using data from the Shared National Credit Program, a credit register of syndicated bank loans 
administered by U.S. regulators. We examine the 2007-2009 financial crisis as a market-wide 
liquidity shock and control for loan demand using a loan fixed effects approach. We find that 
banks with a greater reliance on wholesale funding at the onset of the crisis were more likely 
to exit loan syndicates during the crisis. Our analysis identifies the importance of bank liquidity 
risk management as a motivation for loan sales, in addition to the credit risk transfer motive 
emphasized in prior literature. 
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Chapter 1: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Debtholders: 
Evidence from CDS Spread Response to Shareholders’ Votes 
1.1 Introduction 
In this paper we provide causal estimates for the effect of changes in a firm’s internal corporate 
governance structure on the riskiness of its debt. We do so by exploiting the outcome of shareholders’ votes 
on governance proposals in annual meetings. More specifically, we use the discontinuity in vote outcome 
around the election threshold as an exogenous shift in passing governance proposals. This enables us to 
overcome the endogeneity problem of the effect of changes in corporate governance on riskiness of debt. 
Therefore we are able to determine whether improvement in corporate governance that results from giving 
the shareholders more rights and voice actually benefits debtholders or costs them. 
Better corporate governance can affect debtholders through several channels. First, it can better align 
management interests with those of shareholders and therefore exacerbate risk shifting (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Management can transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders by taking on more 
risky investments without increasing company's total value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dann and 
DeAngelo, 1983). Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) provide evidence that stronger corporate governance as a 
result of more concentrated institutional ownership has an adverse effect on yields and ratings. 
Second, more shareholder control can alleviate the agency problem. Managers’ actions to maximize 
their own wealth often create risk that may differ from the best interest of stakeholders.  The pursuit of self-
interest can lead the managers to forgo long-term return in favor of short-term return (Murphy and 
Zimmerman (1993), or to enlarge the company through unprofitable investments to increase their 
compensation (Murphy, 1985). Hence, any governance mechanism that can limit manager’s opportunistic 
behavior benefits debtholders as well as shareholders. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that firms that have 
larger institutional ownership and stronger outside control of the board enjoy lower bond yields and higher 
ratings on their new bond issues. Fields et al., (2012) show that firms that have higher quality boards with a 
greater advisory presence borrow at lower interest rates. 
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Third, more shareholder rights reduces the information asymmetry. A sound governance mechanism can 
reduce manipulation of accounting information and induce managers to disclose more (Carcello and Neal, 
2000). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., (2006) document that rating is positively related to accrual quality. Anderson 
et al., (2004) find that fully independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower cost of 
debt financing. 
Fourth, governance provisions can change antitakeover protections and alter a company’s risk. On one 
hand, several studies show that more antitakeover protections result in lower risk for the company. Stein 
argues that antitakeover protections can reduce risk by encouraging managers to invest in long-term, value-
increasing projects (e.g. R&D). Warga and Welch (1993) point out that lack of protection could increase 
financial risk since a company can end up more leveraged after an acquisition. Klock et al., (2005) find that 
strong antitakeover provisions are associated with a lower cost of debt financing. Chava et al., (2008) find 
that firms with the lowest takeover defense pay a higher spread on their bank loans than firms with the 
highest takeover defense. Finaly et al., (2007) show that shareholder control is associated with higher yields 
if the firm is exposed to takeovers. In contrast, other studies show that fewer protections against takeover 
may benefit the debtholder by reducing the company’s risk after takeover.  Billet et al., (2004) find that 
below investment grade target bonds earn significantly positive announcement period returns.  
Given the theory’s conflicting predictions, it remains an empirical question whether better corporate 
governance benefits debtholders as well as shareholders. The main challenge with empirically answering 
this question is to find a clean identification strategy. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) pointed out that unless 
one can identify an exogenous shift in corporate governance structure it’s very difficult to make a causal 
statement about the effect of corporate governance on any outcome in a firm, including the riskiness of its 
debt. This is because the corporate governance structure itself is an endogenous choice within a firm, and 
therefore it may very well be correlated with other unobservable firm characteristics that are simultaneously 
determining the risk of debt. Disregarding this delicate endogeneity issue can result in a misleading estimate 
of this effect. To see this, we here use our own sample to replicate a simple version of the approach taken 
in the empirical literature to answer this question. 
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As it will be illustrated in more detail later, we measure the risk of a company’s debt using Credit Default 
Swap (CDS) spreads. The CDS is a financial swap contract in which the seller insures the buyer against a 
loan default in return for a series of periodic payments calculated from the CDS spread. The riskier the debt 
of a company in terms of probability of default, the higher the CDS spread. Following the literature here we 
use Gompers et al., (2003) index for corporate governance, also known as the G-index. This index, 
constructed by using the incidence of 24 governance rules, is a proxy for the level of shareholder rights. The 
higher the G-Index, the lower are the shareholders’ rights in the company. Table 1.1 displays the estimation 
results for a naïve OLS regression of CDS spreads on G-index, controlling for conventional control variables 
(size, leverage, ROA, interest coverage ratio, and rating). The main coefficient of interest in this table is the 
G-index coefficient, which is estimated to be -5.177 and is statistically significant at the 4% level. In line 
with the literature, it is tempting to interpret this coefficient as a 5.1 basis points (bps) drop in CDS spread 
as a result of deterioration of corporate governance by one unit increase in G-index. However, this distorted 
result is an artifact generated by endogeneity between the governance measure and the riskiness of debt for 
a firm. In fact, as we will show, the causal impact of changes in corporate governance proposals on CDS 
spread is positive, not negative. 
We follow the identification strategy used by Cuñat et al., (2012) and in Cellini et al., (2010) and use 
shareholders’ votes on a variety of corporate governance proposals at annual meetings. Even though the 
percentage of votes for or against a proposal itself is a choice variable by the shareholders and is therefore 
endogenous, as we near the election threshold, 50%, any small shift in votes may randomly switch the 
election results from a pass to a reject or vice versa. Therefore, it is safe to consider this set up as a so-called 
“natural experiment” in which the observations are semi-randomly assigned to the treatment (here pass) and 
control (here reject) groups within a small window around the election threshold. This semi-random 
assignment mechanism creates a unique opportunity to identify the effect of passing a governance proposal 
on the outcome of interest, here being the risk of debt, measured by the CDS spread1. 
                                                          
1 Cunat et al., (2012) use this identification strategy to measure the effect of passing corporate governance proposals on 
shareholders’ return. They find the effect to be positive and significant: adopting a governance proposal increases shareholder value 
by 2.8%.  
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Using a regression discontinuity approach within a narrow window of votes around the election 
threshold we compare the average adjusted CDS spread change2 for the treated groups (those which 
narrowly pass) vs. the control groups (those that narrowly fail to pass).  We find that improvements in a 
firm’s internal control reduce the risk of debt significantly: passing a single governance proposal on average 
reduces the CDS spread by about 6 basis points, which is statistically different from zero. Next, we study 
the dynamics of the effect taking into account the possibility that on some voting dates more than one 
proposal was put to vote. For this we use the whole sample of votes by incorporating the information 
contained in the magnitude of votes by separate polynomials on each side of the threshold (as it is standard 
in the regression discontinuity design framework introduced by Lee and Lemieux (2010)). We find that the 
decline in CDS spread as a response to passing a governance proposal is mostly concentrated on the first 
two days after the election. Overall, we find causal evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that more 
shareholder rights is beneficial to debtholders as well.  
Next, we study the heterogeneity of the effect with respect to proposal types (G-index vs. non-G-index) 
and the rating quality of the bond issues. We find that the effect of improvement in governance is more 
pronounced for firms with lower credit ratings. We also find that non-G-Index governance proposals are the 
drivers of the effect on the risk of debt, which is consistent with the previous literature. These results 
contribute to current literature by identifying a new channel through which corporate governance impacts 
debtholders by lessening the conflict between shareholders and management. Finally, by looking at long-
term effects of improvement in corporate governance we find that debt ratings improve over the next six 
years after the election, starting from the second year. This result indicates that the long-term real change in 
the risk of debt is consistent with the short-term reaction in CDS spreads.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we provide novel empirical evidence that 
debtholders closely follow the voting outcome during the annual shareholders meeting and have a short-
term reaction to it. Shareholders’ reaction to a close vote is already documented in the literature. Cuñat et 
al., (2012) find that adopting one governance proposal increases shareholder value by 2.8%. Flammer (2013) 
                                                          
2 The difference between a company CDS spread change (dollar-denominated CDS on senior unsecured debt with 5-year maturity 
and Mod R restructuring clause) and average change in spread for the companies CDS (same characteristics as the company) with 
the same rating. For more details, check the data section. 
5 
 
shows that the adoption of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) proposals leads to 1.77% announcement 
returns. For debtholders we find that unanticipated improvements in governance mechanisms as a result of 
the adoption of shareholder proposals are welcome. They react by favorably changing their expectation of 
the company’s risk on the same day. Second, this is the first paper using the derivative market instrument 
prices to measure the effect of corporate governance on debtholders. The liquidity and homogeneity of the 
CDS compared to bonds and loans make the analysis more feasible and more reliable. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the data used in our analysis. 
Section 1.3 presents the empirical design and explains our methodology. Section 1.4 presents our empirical 
results, and Section 1.5 concludes.  
  
1.2 Data 
We combine four sources of data for corporate governance measures, default risk and firm 
characteristics. We use governance-related shareholder proposals gathered by Riskmetrics from 1997 to 
2011.  Riskmetrics collected them from the proxy statements of S&P 1500 as well as approximately 500 
additional widely held companies. The outcome of the votes was nonbinding, but as showed in Ertimur et 
al., (2010), 31.1% of shareholder proposals that passed were implemented, compared to only 3.2% of those 
not approved. We require that none of the company names, voting dates and vote results be missing. This 
results in a sample of 5082 proposals from 3147 firm meetings of 1462 companies. We match the voting 
sample with Markit CDS Pricing to get the CDS spreads. Our daily CDS Spread is from January 2001 to 
December 2011. The most common CDSs on North American entities are for senior unsecured debt with 5-
year maturity and following the so-called modified (frequently referred to as Mod R) restructuring. We are 
able to match the CDS spreads for 2729 proposals that were put to vote at 1496 firm-meetings for 409 
companies. Finally, we match the resulting sample to CRSP and COMPUSTAT to add share price and 
financial information to our dataset. 
For several reasons CDS spread is preferred over bond spread to measure the impact of corporate events 
on debtholders (Andres et al., 2012). First, firms have a variety of bonds outstanding with different 
maturities, credit ratings and liquidity. How to aggregate these different bonds to measure the total effect of 
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the event is not obvious. In contrast, only one CDS per firm needs to be valued. Second, CDS spreads are a 
pure measure of credit risk, whereas bond spreads include factors such as interest risk and illiquidity 
(Longstaff et al., 2005). Third, empirical studies (Daniels and Jensen, 2005; Zhu, 2006) show that price 
discovery occurs first in the CDS market and subsequently in the bond market. In addition, CDS contracts 
are more liquid than corporate bonds (Bessembinder et al., 2008), and therefore the market price for them 
is more reliable. 
Following Cuñat et al., (2012), we classify shareholder proposals into six groups: auditors, board 
structure, compensation, antitakeover proposals (G-index), voting, and other. Table 1.2 summarizes these 
proposals. The number of observations increases over time due to the increase in coverage of both 
Riskmetrics and Markit CDS Pricing. The average vote outcome is 37.2%, and out of 2729 proposals in our 
sample, 28.5% of them passed. G-Index related proposals constitute about 35% of the sample with the 
highest approval rate (more than half of them approved). Except for proposals in the Voting category, other 
proposals have only very weak support among shareholders. The appendix table provides detailed 
information on the number of votes, average vote outcome and number of votes in a window around the 
pass-threshold (50%) for the six main categories and all the Riskmetrics subcategories in our sample. G-
Index related proposals have the highest number of observations in the windows around threshold, but the 
Voting group has the highest proportion of voting outcome in the windows. 
Table 1.3 displays the characteristics of the ﬁrms in our sample. The average CDS spread is 136.16 bps, 
which is low compared to the 209 bps, the average spread of all dollar-denominated CDSs on senior 
unsecured debt with 5-year maturity and Mod R restructuring clause from 2001 to 2011, but it is consistent 
with the average credit rating in our sample, BBB. Following the literature in CDS event studies (Andres et 
al., (2012)) we use a rating-adjusted method to calculate adjusted CDS spread change. A rating-adjusted 
CDS spread change is: ASCit = ΔCDSit – Δmarketit = (CDSit - CDSit-1) – (Marketit-Marketit-1)  (1.1) 
 
where Marketit is the average of all dollar-denominated CDSs on senior unsecured debt with 5-year 
maturity and Mod R restructuring clause for entities with the same credit rating as a firm. Cumulative 
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Adjusted CDS Spread Change is the sum of the ASCit for a firm on voting day and one day after that. 
Average Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread Change (0,1) is 0.2 with standard deviation of 18.6, and is not 
statistically significant. 
 
1.3 Empirical Design 
Our empirical design closely follows Cuñat et al., (2012), which follows the methodology developed by 
Cellini et al., (2010) to adapt the regression discontinuity design to an event study. Both studies use this 
framework to estimate the effect of a treatment that is chosen by votes on a set of outcome variables (for 
example a corporate governance proposal in the former or issuing a bond targeted at school facility 
investment in the latter). In both studies, the identification strategy is based on the discontinuity in voting 
outcome around the majority threshold, 50%, used as an exogenous shift in the treatment. The idea is that 
for a narrow window of voting outcomes around the majority threshold, for example votes between 49% 
and 51%, a small noise in votes like a last minute change of mind of a voter can shift a proposal from being 
passed (treatment) to being rejected (control) or vice versa. This provides a unique set up, which is very 
close to a randomized experiment and can be used to measure the causal effect of passing a governance 
proposal on any outcome of interest.    
Consider vft as the percentage of votes for passing a governance proposal for firm f on a meeting date at 
time t. If vft≥ v*, where the v* is the majority threshold, the proposal passes. Using Dft as an indicator for 
whether the proposal is passed or not, we call an observation treated or Dft =1 if vft≥ v*, and otherwise 
untreated or Dft =0.  
To estimate the effect of treatment Dft on an outcome variable yft, (e.g. the effect of passing a governance 
proposal on the adjusted CDS spread) we can write  
𝑦𝑓𝑡 =  𝑘 + 𝜃𝐷𝑓𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓𝑡  (1.2) 
 
where θ is the effect of passing a proposal on an outcome yft , and uft , the error term, is the omitted firm 
characteristics at time t that also affect the outcome variable, yf. The endogneity between the treatment, Dft, 
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and the error term, uft, (i.e. the voting outcome may be a function of unobservable firm characteristics) 
makes it really difficult to estimate θ from equation (1.2).   
To overcome the endogeneity problem, regression discontinuity design uses the exogenous shift in 
voting outcome for a narrow window of votes around the majority threshold. As formally shown by Lee 
(2008), as long as there are random noise components to the vote, the assignment of observations to the 
treatment group (pass a proposal, and therefore Dft=1) and the control group (failing to pass a proposal or Dft=0) can be considered as random. The random assignment of observations to treatment and control 
enables us to get a consistent estimate that is not affected by the omitted variables.  
Following the example of Lee and Lemieux (2010) to use all the observations to improve the efficiency 
of our estimates, we use a polynomial in votes to capture the effect of any variable that is a continuous 
function of the vote and affects the outcome. Using separate polynomials for observations on the right hand 
side, Pr(νft,γr), and on the left hand side, Pl(νft,γl), of the majority threshold we can write  
𝑦𝑓𝑡 =  𝜃𝐷𝑓𝑡 + 𝑃𝑟(𝜈𝑓𝑡, 𝛾𝑟) + 𝑃𝑙(𝜈𝑓𝑡, 𝛾𝑙) + 𝑢𝑓𝑡 (1.3) 
 
Two distinct features of the data distinguish it from a standard regression discontinuity design: (i) the 
dynamic nature of the treatment, i.e. treatments occur at different points of time, and the possibility of 
continuation of the impact of treatment occurs over time in periods after the treatment, and (ii) the intensity 
of treatment, i.e., on some voting days more than one proposal is passed as illustrated in Table 1.5. To 
address the dynamic feature of treatment we follow Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein’s (2010) dynamic 
version of equation (1.3) given by 
𝑦𝑓,𝑡+𝜏 =  𝜃𝜏𝐷𝑓𝑡  + 𝑃𝑟(𝜈𝑓𝑡, 𝛾𝜏𝑟) + 𝑃𝑙(𝜈𝑓𝑡, 𝛾𝜏𝑙) + 𝛼𝜏 + 𝜂𝑐 + 𝜆𝑓𝑡 + 𝑒𝑓𝑡𝜏 (1.4) 
 
where yf,t+τ  is the outcome variable in τ periods after the vote date, ατ is a fixed effect for the time 
distance to election date, ηc is the calendar year fixed effect, and λft is the firm-election fixed effect for firm f in period t.  
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Alternatively, instead of estimating a separate equation for each τ, we can add distributed lags of the 
treatment to the model as follows. Note that in this case the coefficient θ is interpreted as the causal effect 
per proposal passed. 
𝑦𝑓𝑡 =  ∑ 𝜃𝜏 𝐷𝑓,𝑡−𝜏
𝑇
𝜏=0
+  ∑[𝑃𝑟(𝜈𝑓,𝑡−𝜏, 𝛾𝜏𝑟) + 𝑃𝑙(𝜈𝑓,𝑡−𝜏, 𝛾𝜏𝑙)]
𝑇
𝜏=0
+ 𝛼𝜏 + 𝜂𝑐  +  𝜆𝑓𝑡  + 𝑒𝑓𝑡 (1.5) 
 
As for the second feature, multiple proposals, we follow the work of Cunat et al., (2012) and capture the 
intensity of treatment by aggregating the number of proposals, 𝐷𝑓𝑡𝐾 , passed on a meeting day and adding up 
vote shares, ∑ 𝜈𝑓𝑡𝐾𝑁𝐾=1 , for K=1, …, N as follows 
𝑦𝑓𝑡 =  𝜃 ∑ 𝐷𝑓𝑡𝐾 +
𝑁
𝐾=1
 [𝑃𝑟 (∑ 𝜈𝑓𝑡𝐾 , 𝛾𝑟
𝑁
𝐾=1
) + 𝑃𝑙 (∑ 𝜈𝑓𝑡𝐾 , 𝛾𝑙
𝑁
𝐾=1
)] + 𝑢𝑓𝑡 (1.6) 
 
Finally, to combine the dynamic feature with vote aggregation we combine equations (1.5) and (1.6) and 
write 
𝑦𝑓𝑡 =  ∑ 𝜃𝜏  ∑ 𝐷𝑓,𝑡−𝜏𝐾
𝑁
𝐾=1
𝑇
𝜏=0
+  ∑ [𝑃𝑟 (∑ 𝜈𝑓,𝑡−𝜏𝐾 , 𝛾𝜏𝑟
𝑁
𝐾=1
) + 𝑃𝑙 (∑ 𝜈𝑓,𝑡−𝜏𝐾 , 𝛾𝜏𝑙
𝑁
𝐾=1
)]
𝑇
𝜏=0
+ 
𝛼𝜏 + 𝜂𝑐  +  𝜆𝑓𝑡  + 𝑒𝑓𝑡 (1.7) 
 
The next section shows how we use each of the above model specifications to estimate the effect of 
passing corporate governance proposals on the risk of debt, measured by adjusted CDS spreads.  
 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Adjusted CDS Spread Reaction to Shifts in Corporate Governance 
1.4.1.1 The Effect of Corporate Governance Proposals on Adjusted CDS Spread 
Table 1.4 reports the difference in absolute cumulative adjusted CDS spreads for companies for which 
corporate governance proposals were narrowly passed and narrowly rejected from the election date to one 
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day after.  Column [1] shows that this difference is highly insignificant (with a p-value of 0.92) for the whole 
sample, reflecting the predictability of the non-close votes. In other words, when the market expects a 
governance proposal to be passed (or rejected) by a large margin of votes there is little uncertainty left for 
the day of voting, and therefore CDS spreads will adjust prior to the actual passage (rejection) of the 
proposal, resulting in no abnormal return on the election date. In Column [2] the sample is restricted to 
proposals that were either passed with less than 60% of votes or were rejected with more than 40% of votes 
(within 10% of election threshold of 50%). As a result, the sample size drops from 2718 to 776, reflecting 
the fact that the majority (71.4%) of proposals are passed (or rejected) by a large margin. Although still 
insignificant, the difference starts to widen to -2.049 basis points (bps) here. Even though further restriction 
of the sample to proposals with votes within 5% of election threshold in column [3] further cuts the sample 
size to almost half of that in column [2] (or 15% of the whole sample in column [1]), it nevertheless results 
in a larger and statistically significant difference in adjusted CDS spread: passing a corporate governance 
proposal here lowers the adjusted CDS spread by 4.040 bps, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Narrowing the interval even further around the election threshold to 2% and 1% in columns [4] and [5], 
shrinking the sample size to only 170 and 105, makes this difference even larger: a drop of 4.060 bps and 
5.169 bps respectively, both statistically significant at 2% and 9% respectively.  
Finally, opening the window to the entire sample but controlling for distance to the threshold in column 
[6] results in a similar conclusion. There is a highly significant (p-value < 0.01) drop in adjusted CDS spread 
by 6.125 bps as a result of passage of a corporate governance proposal. The distance to threshold is 
controlled here by means of two separate polynomials of order six in the vote on each side of the threshold 
as it was described in equation (1.3) in the previous section.    
1.4.1.2 Graphical Analysis of Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread  
Figure 1.1 shows the difference in average cumulative adjusted CDS spreads for corporate governance 
proposals that are passed and rejected within 2% of the election threshold in a time window around the 
election date. The time window varies from 2 days prior to election to 7 days after the election date. This is 
the same measure as that in the column [4] of Table 1.4, except that in Table 1.4 the adjusted CDS spread 
is computed over (0, +1) time window, whereas here it is calculated for nine consecutive windows, from (-
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2,0) to (0,+7), where t=0 is the election date. (Note that for t=1 or equivalently the (0,+1) time window, the 
value is -4.060, which identical to the value in column [4] of Table 1.4). Also presented are 90% confidence 
intervals as indicated by dashed lines.  
We can see from the graph that prior to election date the cumulative adjusted CDS spreads for the 
proposals that pass are insignificantly higher than those that do not pass by 0.3 bps for (-2,0) time window 
and insignificantly lower by 0.2 bps for (-1,0) time window. After the election date, the cumulative adjusted 
CDS spread for the passing proposals is 4.06 bps lower than the rejected proposals in one day (time window 
(0, +1)), which is statistically significant at 3%. This difference widens to an average of -6.78 bps over the 
following days, t=+2 to t=+7. We can also observe that the largest drop in difference in cumulative spreads 
occurs on the first day following the election with no reversal pattern on the following days. Thus, by 
demanding a lower spread for the less risky debt, investors seem to perceive improvement in corporate 
governance positively. This reaction materializes mainly on the first day after the election, continuing with 
a further marginal drop in spread on the following three days. 
1.4.1.3 Dynamic Model with Vote Aggregation    
On one hand the graphical analysis in Figure 1.1 indicates that even though the effect of the vote is seen 
mainly on the first day after an election, it continues to lower the CDS spreads until t=+4 when it starts to 
stabilize with a slight reversal at t=+7. Therefore, we may expect the effect to persist over a few days after 
an election. On the other hand, all 2,718 proposals in the sample were put to vote on 1,492 firm-meeting 
dates, indicating the fact that on some election dates more than one proposal was put to vote. Even though 
about 57% of the proposals were put to vote on meeting dates when there was only a single proposal to vote 
on, there are also meeting dates when several proposals were put to vote. Table 1.5 summarizes the 
frequency of proposals by whether they passed or failed to pass. We can see from Table 1.5 that the number 
of proposals per meeting ranges from 1 to 9. One may naturally expect to see a stronger impact of votes on 
CDS spreads as the number of passed proposals (or intensity of treatment) increases. Therefore, because of 
both potential persistence of impact and the possibility of the intensity of treatment effect, we need to go 
beyond the simple demonstration of data in Table 1.4 by (i) investigating the dynamics of this impact using 
a distributed lagged model over the days following an election date as in equation (1.5) to capture the 
12 
 
potential persistence, and (ii) aggregating the number of proposals that passed per firm-meeting and their 
corresponding vote shares as in equation (1.6) to incorporate the intensity of treatment. This task calls for 
combining equations (1.5) and (1.6), resulting in equation (1.7), for which the estimation results are shown 
in Table 1.6. 
Columns [1] to [3] in Table 1.6 illustrate the effect of passing a proposal on adjusted CDS spread on 
meeting date t (θτ in equation (1.7)) one day after the election date or t+1, and the cumulative effect from 
t+2 to t+7. What distinguishes the different columns in Table 1.6 is the set of fixed effect terms used in 
model specification. Given that here the window around an election threshold is opened to include virtually 
the whole sample, as described earlier, the information contained in distance-to-threshold for votes on each 
meeting date is incorporated using separate polynomials in vote shares on each side of the threshold. The 
coefficients for each polynomial are allowed to vary for each of the lagged periods. 
Overall we find that the effect of passing a corporate governance proposal on the adjusted CDS spread 
is almost equally distributed over the first two days of an election. For example, in column [3], which has 
the richest set of fixed effects, the CDS spreads drop by 1.79 bps on the day of an election, followed by a 
1.91 bps drop on the first day after the election, adding up to a 3.70 bps decline over the first two days. In 
all specifications in columns [1] to [3] we can see that the declining pattern in CDS spreads is persistent 
over the first two days. Consistent with the notion of no reversal pattern over the following days, the decline 
in adjusted CDS spread continues over the following six days, but the drop is statistically insignificant. 
In sum, using a regression discontinuity design we are able to document the causal effect of passing a 
corporate governance proposal on the risk of debt, measured by the adjusted CDS spread. This negative and 
significant effect ranges between a 2.86 bps and a 3.70 bps drop in adjusted CDS spreads, depending on the 
model specification. As we discussed, this impact is mainly present over the first two days of election, with 
no reversal pattern in the following days.  Consistent with the hypothesis that improvements in corporate 
governance benefit both shareholders and debtholders, this result indicates that corporate governance 
improvements have immediate consequences for the debtholders by lowering the risk of debt.  
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1.4.2 Further Evidence: Heterogeneity of the Impact of Votes on Adjusted CDS 
Spreads 
1.4.2.1 Heterogeneity with Respect to Ratings 
 In the previous section we provided empirical evidence that improvement in corporate governance, 
quantified by the number of governance proposals that are passed at a shareholder meeting, reduces the debt 
riskiness, as measured by the adjusted CDS spread. We have argued that this evidence supports the 
hypothesis that better corporate governance benefits all parties: shareholders and debtholders. In this section 
we present further evidence supporting this view.  
If improvement in corporate governance is beneficial to debtholders, as well as shareholders, the market 
reaction should be stronger for high yield companies that are closer to default. Investment grade companies 
are already well distanced from default, and any additional increase should not significantly enhance the 
debtholders’ position. On the other hand, lenders to high yield companies are very concerned about the 
default risk; hence any development in that regard will be highly noticed. Therefore we expect to see larger 
tightening in the adjusted CDS spread for a high yield company when a governance proposal passes 
compared to the approval of the same proposal for an investment grade company. This is exactly what we 
find in Table 1.7.     
In Table 1.7 we split the sample into investment grade and high yield bond issues and re-estimate 
equation (1.7) for each subsample. Columns [1] and [2] ([3] and [4]) report the results for a version of 
equation (1.7) without (with) firm fixed effects. Focusing on the full version of the model with firm fixed 
effects in columns [3] and [4], we see that passing a corporate governance proposal has a negative but 
insignificant effect on the CDS spread for investment grade bonds, whereas it significantly lowers the CDS 
spread for high yield issues. Column [3] shows that for investment grade bonds, the CDS spread falls by 
0.45 bps on the voting day, 1.17 bps a day after the voting day, 0.02 bps two days later and by 1.04 between 
three to seven days after the voting day—but all are statistically insignificant. In contrast, in column [4] we 
observe that for high yield bonds the drop in CDS spread is both statistically and economically significant. 
The CDS spread drops by 5.21 bps on the voting day, 6.14 bps a day later and by 8.04 two days after the 
voting day.  
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To sum up, in a three day window from the day of voting until two days after the voting day, the CDS 
spread for investment grade bonds falls by only 1.65 bps, which is not statistically different from zero, 
whereas for high yield bonds, the drop is 19.4 bps, an order of magnitude lager and statistically significant. 
Our result is very intuitive: consistent with the hypothesis that enhancements in corporate governance 
benefit the debtholder by lowering the risk of debt, the benefit is larger for those debtholders that need it 
most, i.e., in companies closer to default. 
1.4.2.2 Heterogeneity with Respect to Proposal Type    
Cuñat et al., (2012) provide evidence that the positive effect of passing governance proposals on equity 
return is mostly driven by anti-takeover (or G-index) proposals and not by other (non-G-index) proposals. 
We find evidence that the opposite is true for the effect on CDS spreads: the drop in riskiness of debt is 
mainly driven by the passage of non-G-Index proposals and not G-index proposals.  
Table 1.8 illustrates the estimation results for a modified version of equation (1.7) where we estimate 
separate coefficients for θ’s, and γ’s for G-index and non-G-index (other) proposals. The upper panel of this 
table reports the CDS spread reaction to passing G-index (antitakeover) proposals, and the lower panel 
shows the same effect for other (non-G-index) proposals. In all three columns in Table 1.8 we can see that 
while CDS spreads decrease in response to passing both G-index and other proposals, the drop is stronger—
both statistically and economically—for other (non-G-index) proposals. In column [3] for example, in a 
three-day window from t=0 to t=2 the CDS spread falls by only 2.6 for G-index proposals (non-significant), 
whereas it drops by more than 9 bps for other proposals. Also note that unlike the pattern in Tables 1.6 and 
1.7, where the decline in CDS spreads is larger on the second day (and even larger on the third day), here 
the largest drop in CDS spread happens on the first day (voting day), suggesting a closer attention of the 
debtholders to other (non-G-index) proposals.   
Next, we investigate whether or not our result is driven by the same proposal types that drive the positive 
effect of governance on equity return documented in Cuñat et al., (2012). As tabulated in the appendix, the 
list of other proposals with greater numbers of votes around the majority threshold that are driving our 
results includes compensation-related proposals (advisory vote on compensation and expense stock 
options), voting-related proposals (majority vote to elect directors) and board-related proposals (separate 
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chairman/CEO). In contrast, in Cuñat et al., (2012) the result is driven by G-index proposals: delay-related 
(repeal classified board), voting-related (cumulative voting and eliminate supermajority), protection-related 
(vote on future golden parachutes) and other (redeem or vote poison pill) proposals. It’s worth it to mention 
that 4 out of 5 of the latter proposal types overlap with 6 E-index proposals that Bebchuck et al., (2004) 
claim to be most important among 24 G-index proposals. Comparison of the debtholder-related to 
shareholder-related proposals suggests that while shareholders care more about proposals that directly 
empower them, debtholders seem to be more sensitive to proposals that address the shareholder-
management agency problem by reforming the incentive structure for managers. This again supports the 
notion that improvements in corporate governance lower the risk of debt by alleviating the shareholder-
management conflict.  
This finding further clarifies why although our results seem contradictory on the surface, they can be 
reconciled with the findings of studies that find an increase in the risk of debt as a result of improvement in 
corporate governance (for example, Klock et al., 2005; Cremers et al., 2007; Chava et al., 2008). The 
difference in our vs. their results–at least partially—is driven by two diverse sets of influential proposals 
that cause the changes in corporate governance: while our result, that improvement in governance lowers 
the risk of debt, is mainly driven by non-G-index (other) proposals, in contrast the opposite result in the 
literature, that governance improvement increases debt riskiness, is driven by the passage of G-index 
(antitakeover) provisions. Therefore, we establish that our results contribute to this literature by identifying 
a new channel through which corporate governance impacts debtholders by lessening the conflict between 
shareholders and management. 
1.4.3 Effect of Governance Proposals on Long-term Ratings  
In this section we investigate whether the immediate decline in risk of debt that was documented in 
previous sections is consistent with the evolution of default probabilities over the long-term. In particular, 
we are interested in determining whether the drop in CDS spreads over the days following a voting date is 
predictive of improvements in long-term credit ratings. To investigate this we use the model specification 
in equation (1.6) with separate polynomials of order four on each side of the threshold.  
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Estimation results are reported in Table 1.9. The dependent variable in all models is the rating index, 
which is equal to +1 for “D” rated bonds and increases to +7 for “AAA” bonds. The Pass coefficient in 
Table 1.9 estimates the difference between changes in ratings for proposals that pass vs. the ones that fail to 
pass over the years after an election date. We observe in column [1] that one year after election this 
difference is positive but statistically insignificant. However, from the second year on, the difference 
becomes positive, significant and increasingly significant until year 6. For example, in column [2] we see 
that 2 years after the election the average credit rating increases by 0.445 of a notch. This can be seen from 
Figure 1.2, a graphical representation of changes in long-term ratings, or the Pass coefficient. Also in Figure 
1.2, the 90% confidence interval for each data point is represented by a straight line above and below the 
point, which is helpful for testing it against zero.  
Notice that in Figure 1.2 the improvements in a firm’s rating after the governance proposal is passed 
seems very persistent over time. It follows an increasing pattern and stays significantly away from zero. 
Therefore we conclude that the long-term real effect of passing governance proposals materializes as 
improvement in credit rating indicating lower probability of default. This is consistent with the short-term 
drop in CDS spread that we documented in previous sections.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 We have estimated the causal effect of improvements in internal corporate governance on the current 
debtholders by exploiting the discontinuity in the vote outcome of shareholder governance proposals around 
the majority threshold. The uncertainty around proposals that falls around the majority threshold provides a 
locally exogenous shock to the corporate governance, enabling us to estimate the effect of passing a 
governance proposal on the default risk. Our identification strategy allows us to overcome the limitation in 
the existing literature and document the causal effect of shareholder rights on debtholders. 
We show that the passage of a governance related proposal can reduce the default risk. On average, the 
cumulative adjusted CDS spread change lowers by about 6 bsp on voting day and the day after. Most of the 
change in adjusted CDS spread occurs over the 2 days after the meeting, and there is no sign of reversal 
after that. These results support the hypothesis that more shareholder rights are also beneficial to debtholders 
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by reducing the default risk. Consistent with the short-run reaction of the CDS market, the corporate rating 
of firms that pass a proposal by a close margin improved by about half a notch 2 years after the voting 
compared to ratings for firms that reject it by a close margin. The documented effect is stronger for non-G-
Index related proposals and for firms with a noninvestment grade rating.  
The results in this paper, however, must be interpreted with caution. Although using CDS spread change 
in this corporate event study provides a clean way to evaluate the event effect on default risk and debtholders, 
it restricts the sample to large established companies with outstanding CDS contracts. Generalizing the 
results to other companies, especially small ones exposed to takeover risk, demands more research. For these 
small firms, passage of shareholder proposals can increase takeover risk. As takeovers usually coincide with 
higher leverage and seniority downgrade of the existing debt, such proposals can have the opposite effect 
on debtholders in exposed companies (Warga and Welch, 1993). 
We have focused on identifying the effect of corporate governance improvements on only one feature 
of the firm’s debt, namely, the risk of debt. However, one can potentially investigate the effect of changes 
in corporate governance on other features of the firm’s debt such as the debt covenants. Adding debt 
covenants to the debt contract when a new debt is issued is a way for the debtholders to alleviate the agency 
problem by limiting the actions that management can take that may harm them. An interesting question here 
is whether or not better corporate governance substitutes for the necessity to add restrictive debt covenants 
to the contract. One could use the same identification strategy used in this paper to determine whether 
passing a corporate governance proposal leads to less restrictive debt covenants for new debt issued in the 
future. 
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1.6 Figures 
Figure 1.1: Cumulative CDS Adjusted Return around the Election Date. The solid line in this figure 
presents the dynamics of the average effect of passing a corporate governance proposal on the adjusted 
change in CDS spreads over different time windows around the meeting date, t = 0. The dashed lines present 
the 90% confidence interval for this effect. The effect is measured using a regression of the adjusted change 
in CDS spreads on whether the proposal passed or not for observations within 2 points of the majority 
threshold for a rolling window of time. This window starts from two days before meeting to the meeting 
date, [-2,0], and next moves to [-1,0], [0,1], [0,2], [0,3], [0,4], [0,5], [0,6], and [0,7]. 
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Figure 1.2: Long-term Effect of Governance Proposals on Debt Rating. This figure illustrates the effect 
of passing governance proposals on a firm’s debt rating in the long-term. Squares are the regression 
coefficients of the Pass variable in Table 1.9, also given by equation (1.7). Error bars present 90% 
confidence intervals for the Pass coefficient in the same table.  
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1.7 Tables 
Table 1.1: G-Index and Change in Adjusted CDS spread. This table displays the result of the OLS 
regression of changes in annual adjusted CDS spread on G-Index and the following controls for 2002, 2004 
and 2006. Control variables include Accounting variables from Compustat that are used as control: Size 
(ln(at)), Leverage ((dltt+ dlc)/ at), ROA (ib/at), Interest Coverage Ratio  (oibdp/xint) and an integer index 
between 1 to 10 for Rating (corresponding to D to AAA respectively). 
 
  CDS Spread 
G-Index -5.177** 
 (0.04) 
Company Level Controls Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
R 0.5481 
N 960 
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Table 1.2: Shareholder Governance Proposals. This table summarizes the shareholder proposals for 
observations with non-missing company name, voting date and vote result from Riskmetrics and CDS from 
Markit from 2001 to 2011. We do not have the passage threshold for each voting. We assume that the 
threshold is 50%, which is consistent with footnote 6 of Cunat et al., (2012) (In their sample the threshold 
for approval is 50% for all but 10 observations). 
 
Panel A: Shareholder Proposal Summary Statistics 
 
Year Shareholder Proposals 
Approved 
Proposals 
Percentage Approved 
Proposals 
Average Vote 
Outcome 
Std. Dev. Vote 
Outcome 
2001 106 21 19.8% 27.1% 21.07 
2002 179 61 34.1% 36.1% 22.60 
2003 333 112 33.6% 35.3% 23.59 
2004 291 76 26.1% 32.0% 24.69 
2005 274 75 27.4% 34.5% 23.37 
2006 318 104 32.7% 40.8% 22.80 
2007 328 83 25.3% 36.9% 21.69 
2008 214 50 23.4% 38.0% 22.62 
2009 282 93 33.0% 43.2% 20.39 
2010 245 66 26.9% 40.3% 19.71 
2011 159 37 23.3% 40.0% 20.53 
Total 2729 778 28.5% 37.2%  
 
Panel B: Type of Governance Proposals 
 
Proposal Type 
Shareholder 
Proposals 
Percentage Approved 
Proposals 
Average Vote 
Outcome 
Audit 35 2.9% 16.6% 
Board 383 3.4% 25.1% 
Compensation 923 10.4% 27.2% 
G-Index 949 58.2% 53.8% 
Voting 228 40.8% 47.8% 
Other 211 10.9% 20.2% 
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics. Our sample consists of 2729 proposals from 1496 firm-year 
observations. CDS Spread is the spread of CDSs for a firm’s five-year senior unsecured debt with modified 
restructuring clause in basis point (Markit). Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread Change is the sum of the 
Adjusted CDS Spread Change on voting day and one day after (Markit). Stock Abnormal Returns are 
computed using the Fama–French and momentum factors (CRSP). Accounting variables are from 
Compustat: Total Asset, Leverage ((dltt+ dlc)/ at), ROA (ib/at), Interest Coverage (oibdp/xint) and Rating. 
We assign numbers from 1 to 10 to the S&P bond ratings (D to AAA). 
 
  N Mean Std. Dev. 5th Per. 95th Per. 
CDS Spread (Basis Point) 1496 136.16 283.2 13.64 467.96 
Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread Change (bps)  1489 0.20 18.6 -10.98 12.03 
Stock Abnormal Return on meeting day 1496 0.0004 0.017 -0.02 0.03 
Asset ($millions) 1494 82047.63 210587.8 3092.78 410063.20 
Leverage 1492 0.29 0.2 0.06 0.60 
ROA 1494 0.04 0.1 -0.04 0.14 
Interest Coverage 1379 44.43 807.0 1.21 44.41 
Rating 1490 7.20 1.3 5.00 9.00 
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Table 1.4: Adjusted CDS Spread Response to Governance Proposals around the Majority Threshold. 
This table presents regression results of the cumulative adjusted change in CDS spreads from the day of the 
meeting t = 0 to the next day t = 1 in response to passage of a governance proposal. Adjusted CDS spreads 
are calculated using a rating-adjusted method as in Andres et al., (2012). The model specification for 
columns [1]-[5] is given in equation (1.2) and for column [6] in equation (1.3). Column [1] estimates are 
based on the whole sample. Column [2] restricts the sample to observations with a vote share within 10 
points of the threshold, column [3] to [5] restrict the sample to 5, 2 and 1 points of the threshold respectively. 
Column [6] uses the full sample (winsorized at 1% and 99%) by introducing a polynomial in the vote share 
of order 6, one on each side of the threshold. All columns control for year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. P-values are reported in parentheses, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. 
 
Cumulative Changes in Adjusted CDS Spread 
 
 All Votes −10; +10 −5; +5 −2; +2 −1; +1 Full Model 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Pass -0.128 -2.049 -4.040*** -4.060** -5.169* -6.125*** 
 (0.92) (0.16) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.00) 
R2 0.0102 0.0098 0.0343 0.0655 0.0822 0.0184 
N 2718 776 387 170 105 2718 
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Table 1.5: Frequency of proposals per firm meeting. This table presents the frequency of numbers of 
proposals that are put to vote on a single meeting day in our sample. Column [1] displays the total number 
of proposals on a meeting day, column [2] shows the number of proposals that received at least 50% of 
shareholder votes, column [3] shows number of proposals that received less than 50% of votes, and column 
[4] is the ratio of column [2] divided by column [1]. 
 
Number of Proposals per Meeting Total Passed Not Passed % Passed 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
1 850 326 524 38.35% 
2 700 197 503 28.14% 
3 408 112 296 27.45% 
4 320 81 239 25.31% 
5 200 27 173 13.50% 
6 90 13 77 14.44% 
7 49 6 43 12.24% 
8 56 5 51 8.93% 
9 45 8 37 17.78% 
Total 2718 1199 3002 28.50% 
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Table 1.6: Dynamics of Impact of Aggregate Votes on Adjusted CDS Spreads. This table presents the 
effect of passing a proposal on changes in adjusted CDS spread on the meeting date (t), one day after (t+1), 
and the cumulative effect from t+2 to t+7. The dependent variable is the adjusted CDS spreads that are 
calculated using a rating-adjusted method as in Andres et al., (2012). The model specification is given in 
equation (1.7). All columns control for year fixed effects, distance to election fixed effects, and they use 
seven separate polynomials of order six to control for the effect of any determinant of changes in adjusted 
CDS spreads that is continuous in vote share. Standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values are reported 
in parentheses, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. 
 
Changes in Adjusted CDS Spread Using All Proposals 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Day of Vote, t -1.324** -1.363** -1.790* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) 
One Day Later, t+1 -1.535* -1.585* -1.907 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.19) 
Days t+2 to t+7 -2.269 -2.645 -5.734 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.25) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes  
Firm-Meeting Fixed Effect   Yes 
Distance to Election Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0077 0.0392 0.1314 
N 11,338 11,338 11,338 
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneity in the Effect of Votes on Adjusted CDS Spreads with respect to Ratings. 
This table compares the regression of the changes in adjusted CDS spreads on the passage of proposals for 
companies with investment grade bond rating vs. non-investment grade (high yield) issues. The dependent 
variable is the adjusted CDS spreads that are calculated using a rating-adjusted method as in Andres et al., 
(2012). The model specification is given in equation (1.7). The results for companies with investment grade 
bond rating are presented in columns [1] and [3], and non-investment grades are in columns [2] and [4]. All 
columns control for year fixed effects, distance to election fixed effects, and they use seven separate 
polynomials of order six to control for the effect of any determinant of changes in adjusted CDS spreads 
that is continuous in vote share. Standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values are reported in parentheses 
and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. 
 
Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread 
 
Investment 
Grade 
High       
Yield 
Investment 
Grade 
High       
Yield 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Day of Vote, t -0.436 -4.741* -0.452 -5.213* 
 (0.33) (0.09) (0.34) (0.09) 
One Day Later, t+1 -1.189 -5.494** -1.171 -6.140** 
 (0.19) (0.03) (0.19) (0.02) 
Two days later, t+2 -0.035 -7.182* -0.024 -8.038** 
 (0.92) (0.06) (0.95) (0.05) 
Days t+3 to t+7 -0.829 -2.513 -1.042 -5.739 
 (0.38) (0.30) (0.33) (0.26) 
Firm Fixed Effect   Yes Yes 
R2 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.08 
N 8582 2794 8582 2794 
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Table 1.8: Adjusted CDS Spread by Proposal Types. This table compares the regression of the changes 
in adjusted CDS spreads on the passage of G-index vs. non-G-index (other) proposals.  The dependent 
variable is the adjusted CDS spreads that are calculated using a rating-adjusted method as in Andres, Betzer 
and Doumet (2012). The model specification is given in equation (1.7). The upper (lower) panel illustrates 
the effect of G-index (other) proposals in the adjusted CDS spread. All columns control for year fixed 
effects and distance to election fixed effects, and they use seven separate polynomials of order six to control 
for the effect of any determinant of changes in adjusted CDS spreads that is continuous in vote share. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values are reported in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. 
 
Cumulative Adjusted CDS Spread 
 G-index G-index G-index 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Day of Vote, t -0.874 -0.669 -0.781 
 (0.18) (0.28) (0.57) 
One Day Later, t+1 -1.366 -1.096 -1.224 
 (0.24) (0.36) (0.52) 
Two days later, t+2 -0.974 -0.66 -0.613 
 (0.12) (0.31) (0.67) 
Days t+3 to t+7 2.115 2.758 1.789 
 (0.35) (0.29) (0.80) 
 Other Other Other 
Day of Vote, t -1.979*** -2.306*** -3.489*** 
 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
One Day Later, t+1 -1.739* -2.183** -3.096** 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) 
Two days later, t+2 -1.365 -1.777* -2.463* 
 (0.15) (0.09) (0.08) 
Days t+3 to t+7 -5.345 -6.71 -14.113 
 (0.27) (0.15) (0.14) 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes  
Firm -Meeting Fixed Effect   Yes 
R2 0.014 0.032 0.099 
N 11,376 11,376 11,376 
 
 
28 
 
Table 1.9: Long-term Effect of Governance Proposals on Debt Rating. This table presents the effect of 
passing governance proposals on firm’s debt rating in the long-term. Model specification is given by 
equation (1.6), where the dependent variable is the changes in rating between period t and t+τ. All columns 
control for firm and year fixed effects as well as distance-to-election and year fixed effects. All columns 
allow for two separate polynomials of order four on each side of the majority threshold. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. P-values are reported in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. 
 
 S&P Long-term Issuer Credit Rating 
 t=+1 t=+2 t=+3 t=+4 t=+5 t=+6 t=+7 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Pass 0.101 0.445* 0.616** 0.672** 0.687* 0.701* 0.65 
 (0.30) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to Election 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1558 0.2326 0.3094 0.3991 0.4804 0.565 0.6653 
N 14,557 13,233 11,770 10,187 8,622 7,186 5,862 
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Chapter 2: Local Capital Market and Small Firm Liquidity 
Management 
2.1 Introduction 
The effect of local bank on local economic activity is extensively studied in the previous literature 
(Becker, 2007; Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000; Ashcraft, 2005). The direct effect of local banks on local 
company financial policies has understudied in the previous literature. In this paper we study the effect of 
local banks on the liquidity management of local companies.  
 Kashyap et al. (2002) presents a model showing that there should be a synergy between deposit taking 
and credit line issuance. Hence, it should be cheaper for the banks that have access to more local bank 
deposits to issue more credit line. Given the fact that local banks are important for the local companies 
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002), the companies in an area with more local deposit should have access to cheaper 
credit line. Hence, they should have more credit line, save less cash and have more access to liquidity. 
We test these hypotheses following Becker (2007) identification strategy. The amount of local deposit 
can be high because of the cash saving of local companies, so we need an instrument to identify the causal 
effect of local deposit. We use the fraction of local population over 65 as an instrument to explain the amount 
of local deposit and then estimating the causal effect of that on the local company liquidity management.  
We find that companies save less cash when they are in the area with high amount of local deposit. One 
standard deviation increase in log of local bank deposit per capita reduces the ratio of cash to sales by 2% 
for local companies. However more local bank deposit does not increases the probability of having credit 
line, neither does it increase the amount of credit line and total liquidity for local companies. Consistent 
with the previous results we do not find higher fraction of liquidity in the form of credit line as the amount 
of local deposit increases. Also leverage is not higher when there is more local deposit. 
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2.2 Data 
Data is collected from different sources. The total population and number of seniors are from US Census 
Bureau for 1993, 1998 and 2003.  Table 2.1, Panel A shows that the fraction of population over 65 doesn’t 
change significantly over 10 years. The median reduces about 0.3% from 12.96% in 1993 to 12.68% in 
2003. In 2003 the top 5 counties based on fraction of seniors are Sumter County, Florida (34.13%), Charlotte 
County, Florida (33.6%), Highlands County, Florida (32.06%), Citrus County, Florida (31.64%) and Flagler 
County, Florida (26.78%). The bottom 5 counties in 2003 are Eagle County, Colorado (4.20%), Lake 
County, Colorado (4.20%), Summit County, Colorado (4.45%), Long County, Georgia (4.98%) and Liberty 
County, Georgia (4.98%). 
The income per capita is from Bureau of Economic Analysis. Table 2.1, Panel A shows that the average 
income per capita increases 4% annually from $19160 in 1993 to $28853 in 2003. Deposit data are available 
for each bank branch separately from the FDIC Summary of Deposit. We aggregate at the county level to 
get the county level deposit.  
Table 2.1, Panel B shows the correlation between deposit per capita, total population, fraction of seniors 
and income per capita. Deposit per capita is significantly and positively correlated with the other variables 
at the county level, but fraction of seniors is negatively correlated with total population and income per 
capita. Total population and income per capita are positively correlated. 
Company level data are from Survey of Small Business Financing (SSBF) run by the Federal Reserve 
Board. SSBF collected information on small businesses (fewer than 500 employees) in the United States. 
Owner characteristics, firm size, use of financial services, and the income and balance sheets of the firm are 
just some examples of the types of information collected. We use the information from 1993, 1998 and 2003 
SSBFs. In this sample about 40% of the companies have access to credit line and on average 30% of a 
company liquidity is in the form of credit line. 
2.3 Local seniors and bank deposit 
In this section we articulate the first stage regression. The first stage regression is as follow 
Depositc,t=θ+ρSeniorsc,t+δLc,t+λs+λt+εc,t 
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Depositc,t is the deposit per capita in county c and year t. Seniorsc,t is the fraction of seniors in county 
c in year t. Lc,t is the other county level variables. λs is the state fixed effect and λt is the year fixed effect. 
Table 2.2 presents the first stage regression. 
All columns in Table 2.2 show that fraction of seniors has a positive effect on the deposit per capita and 
it is statistically significant. Based on the coefficient estimate in Column [1], one standard deviation increase 
in the fraction of seniors (3%) corresponds to 3% increase in local deposits per capita. Columns [2] and [3] 
successively include additional controls for total population and income per capita. The fraction of seniors 
is highly significant in all specifications and its effect is stronger in the presence of the other variables. One 
standard deviation increase in the fraction of seniors increases the deposit per capita by about 11% in column 
[2] and [3]. Hence, fraction of local seniors should be a reliable instrument for the amount of local deposit 
per capita. 
 
2.4 Bank deposit and company liquidity management 
Table 2.3-2.8 present the main results. The regression is as follow 
 Hj,t = α + β Depositc,t + γ Xj,t + η Lc,t +  λs + λt +εj,t 
Hj,t is the dependent variable for company j in year t. Depositc,t is the deposit per capita in county c and 
year t. Xj,t is the company level variable for company j in year t. Lc,t is the other county level variables. λs is 
the state fixed effect and λt is the year fixed effect. We run a linear regression in Table 2.4-2.8 and a probit 
model with the same variables in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 shows that contrary to the prediction of our hypotheses, more local bank deposit doesn’t 
increase the odds of having access to credit line for the local companies. The coefficients in both columns 
are negative but none of them are significant. As size increases the probability of having a credit line 
increases, but more profitable firms probably do not use a credit line. 
 In Table 2.4 we do not find a significant effect of the local deposit on amount of credit line of local 
companies, which is consistent with the results in Table 2.3. The relationship is positive but even after using 
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the instrument it is not significant. Profitability and size have a negative effect on the amount of credit line 
although the size effect is not economically significant. 
In Table 2.5 the amount cash saved by companies is negatively related to the local bank deposit, which 
is consistent with our hypotheses. One standard deviation in the log of local deposit (0.36) reduces the ratio 
of cash to sales by 2%. Larger, older, more profitable and less risky companies save less cash.    
Table 2.6 shows that there is no significant relationship between the fraction of liquidity (cash + credit 
line) in the form of credit line and local bank deposit. Larger companies use more credit line as a source of 
liquidity, but as profitability increases the use of credit line decreases. 
Local bank deposit does not change the total liquidity (cash + credit line) available to the local 
companies. Table 2.7 shows that larger and more profitable companies have less cash and credit line. It can 
be because of the fact that these companies have access to term loans easier and need to save less cash 
because of high profitability. 
Table 2.8 shows that there is no relationship between local bank deposit and total debt of the local 
companies. In our sample larger, older and more profitable companies use less debt, which is not consistent 
with the literature using the sample of large companies. It is left for future research to see what can explain 
these differences between large and small companies.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we test couple hypotheses based on the previous literature. If there is a synergy between 
deposit taking and credit line issuance, it should be cheaper for the banks in an area with more local deposit 
to issue credit lines. As saving cash for liquidity purposes is expensive, companies in such an area should 
save less cash and use more credit line. 
We find mixed support for these hypotheses. Companies save less cash as the amount of local deposit 
increases. One standard deviation increases in the amount of local deposit reduces the ratio of cash to sales 
by 2%. Although more local deposit does not increase the ratio of credit line to sales nor the probability of 
having a credit line for the local companies. 
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2.6 Tables 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics.  
 
Panel A: County Level variables 
 1993 1998 2003 
Fraction of population 65+    
Minimum 2.57% 3.6% 4.2% 
Median 12.96% 12.88% 12.68% 
Average 13.99% 12.98% 12.86% 
Maximum 35.17% 36.27% 34.13% 
    
Bank deposits per capita    
Minimum $2727 $2932 $3712 
Median $10456 $11488 $13411 
Average $10751 $11994 $14858 
Maximum $35877 $81459 $389200 
    
Per capita income    
Minimum $7067 $8813 $11750 
Median $18586 $23383 $27970 
Average $19160 $24232 $28853 
Maximum $38422 $52396 $64615 
 
Panel B: Correlations (pooled sample) 
 Bank deposits 
per capita 
Fraction of 
population 65+ 
Log of Total 
Population 
Per capita 
income 
Log of Bank deposits per capita 1    
Fraction of population 65+ 0.18 1   
Log of Total Population 0.31 -0.36 1  
Log of per capita income 0.60 -0.17 0.55 1 
 
Panel C: Company Level Variables (pooled sample)  
 N Average Median Standard deviation 
Having a CL 10777 0.39 0 0.48 
Total CL over Sales 10777 0.09 0 0.28 
Total CL over (Cash +CL) 10320 0.30 0 0.39 
Cash over Sales 10769 0.09 0.03 0.20 
(Cash + CL) over Sales 10769 0.07 0.20 0.44 
Profit over Sales 10777 0.13 0.09 0.41 
Total Debt over Sales 6713 0.28 0.04 0.75 
 
34 
 
Table 2.2: Effect of local seniors on local bank deposit. The table reports the regression of the log of 
local bank deposit on fraction of local seniors using county level data for 1993, 1998 and 2003. The model 
includes dummies for year and states.  Standard errors are in parentheses. * Denotes a significant coefficient 
at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 Log of Deposit 
per capita 
Log of Deposit 
per capita 
Log of Deposit 
per capita 
Fraction of Population 65+ 1.22*** 
(0.147) 
3.74*** 
(0.150) 
3.26*** 
(0.133) 
Log of Total Population  0.09*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.003) 
Log of per capita Income   1.15*** 
(0.029) 
Constant 9.07*** 
(0.020) 
7.06*** 
(0.047) 
-2.45*** 
(0.262) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Square 0.37 0.49 0.60 
N 5298 5298 5283 
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Table 2.3: Relation between having a Credit Line and local bank deposit. Dependent variable is a 
dummy showing if the company has a credit line or not. First column is the probit regression. Second 
column is a probit regression using the fraction of local seniors as the instrument. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and clustered at state level. * Denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
Probit 
 
Probit  
with IV 
 
Log of County Deposit per Capita 0.001 
(0.088) 
-0.196 
(0.204) 
Log of County Deposit per Capita -0.489*** 
(0.153) 
-0.217 
(0.278) 
Log of Sales 0.298*** 
(0.010) 
0.297*** 
(0.0100) 
Age -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Profit/Size -0.177*** 
(0.053) 
-0.177*** 
(0.054) 
D&B Credit Rating -0.008 
(0.025) 
-0.009 
(0.050) 
Constant 
 
0.639 
(1.308) 
-0.210 
(1.506) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Wald Chi-Square test probability 0.00 0.00 
N 10725 10725 
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Table 2.4: Relation between amount of Credit Line and local bank deposit. Dependent variable is the 
amount of Credit Line normalized by total Sales of the company. First column is the OLS regression. 
Second column is 2SLS regression using the fraction of local seniors as the instrument. Standard errors are 
in parentheses and clustered at state level. * Denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
Log of County Deposit per Capita 0.026 
(0.017) 
0.012 
(0.04) 
Log of County Deposit per Capita -0.080*** 
(0.029) 
-0.060 
(0.060) 
Log of Sales -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Age -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
Profit/Size -0.048*** 
(0.017) 
-0.048*** 
(0.017) 
D&B Credit Rating -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Constant 0.705*** 
(0.202) 
0.642** 
(0.273) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Square 0.03 0.03 
N 10725 10725 
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Table 2.5: Relation between amount of Cash and local bank deposit. Dependent variable is the amount 
of Cash normalized by total Sales of the company. First column is the OLS regression. Second column is 
2SLS regression using the fraction of local seniors as the instrument. Standard errors are in parentheses and 
clustered at state level. * Denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at 
the 1% level. 
 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
Log of County Deposit per Capita -0.024** 
(0.011) 
-0.056* 
(0.031) 
Log of County Deposit per Capita 0.072*** 
(0.018) 
0.116*** 
(0.040) 
Log of Sales -0.041*** 
(0.003) 
-0.040*** 
(0.003) 
Age -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
Profit/Size -0.041*** 
(0.010) 
-0.041*** 
(0.010) 
D&B Credit Rating -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Constant 0.135 
(0.128) 
-0.003 
(0.156) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Square 0.12 0.12 
N 10717 10717 
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Table 2.6: Relation between fraction of total Liquidity in form of Credit Line and local bank deposit. 
Dependent variable is ratio of Credit Line to Sum of Credit Line and Cash for a company. First column is 
the OLS regression. Second column is 2SLS regression using the fraction of local seniors as the instrument. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at state level. * Denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% 
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
Log of County Deposit per Capita 0.014 
(0.023) 
-0.017 
(0.497) 
Log of County Deposit per Capita -0.128*** 
(0.440) 
-0.085 
(0.070) 
Log of Sales 0.064*** 
(0.002) 
0.064*** 
(0.002) 
Age -0.0003 
(0.0004) 
-0.003 
(0.0004) 
Profit/Size -0.055*** 
(0.012) 
-0.055*** 
(0.013) 
D&B Credit Rating 0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Constant 0.546 
(0.335) 
0.412 
(0.367) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Square 0.13 0.13 
N 10269 10269 
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Table 2.7: Relation between amount of Total Liquidity and local bank deposit. Dependent variable is 
the amount of Credit Line plus Cash normalized by total Sales of the company. First column is the OLS 
regression. Second column is 2SLS regression using the fraction of local seniors as the instrument. Standard 
errors are in parentheses and clustered at state level. * Denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, 
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
Log of County Deposit per Capita 0.009 
(0.026) 
-0.57 
(0.070) 
Log of County Deposit per Capita 0.022 
(0.043) 
0.088 
(0.102) 
Log of Sales -0.061*** 
(0.003) 
-0.060*** 
(0.003) 
Age -0.001* 
(0.0007) 
-0.001* 
(0.0007) 
Profit/Size -0.138*** 
(0.028) 
-0.138*** 
(0.028) 
D&B Credit Rating -0.012* 
(0.006) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
Constant 0.845*** 
(0.311) 
0.639 
(0.439) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Square 0.08 0.08 
N 10717 10717 
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Table 2.8: Relation between Leverage and local bank deposit. Dependent variable is the company total 
Leverage. First column is the OLS regression. Second column is 2SLS regression using the fraction of local 
seniors as the instrument. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at state level. * Denotes a 
significant coefficient at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
Log of County Deposit per Capita -0.008 
(0.450) 
0.029 
(0.160) 
Log of County Deposit per Capita -0.069 
(0.151) 
-0.123 
(0.279) 
Log of Sales -0.036*** 
(0.010) 
-0.036*** 
(0.010) 
Age -0.004*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.004*** 
(0.0011) 
Profit/Size -0.343*** 
(0.050) 
-0.343*** 
(0.050) 
D&B Credit Rating 0.018 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
Constant 1.36 
(1.09) 
1.56 
(1.44) 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Square 0.10 0.10 
N 6681 6681 
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Chapter 3: Loan Sales and Bank Liquidity Risk Management: 
Evidence from the Shared National Credit Program 
3.1 Introduction 
The basic function of modern banks is to provide liquidity on demand to depositors and to supply funds 
as well as liquidity to their borrowers through loans and lines of credit (Kashyap et al., 2002). Accordingly, 
the bank risk management task involves holding capital to guard against insolvency, and maintaining a store 
of liquid assets as well as access to a variety of borrowing sources to guard against unexpected cash 
shortfalls. Recent financial innovations have changed this traditional role of banks and have had a profound 
impact on liquidity and credit risk management at individual banks (e.g., securitization, as in Loutskina, 
2011; Loutskina and Strahan, 2009). In addition, recent changes in banks’ liability structure, notably, an 
increased dependence on short-term wholesale funding sources, may have further complicated the risk 
management task at modern banks.3 
This paper examines a recent innovation that has changed the landscape of modern financial 
intermediation: the secondary market for commercial bank loans. Since the early 1990s, there has been 
a considerable increase in the liquidity of bank loans due to the arrival of an active secondary market, as 
well as the development of structured finance products.4 Gande and Saunders (2012) present data from the 
Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) showing that the secondary market for bank loans 
grew rapidly from 2000 until 2007, exceeding $100bn of trading volume in each year and peaking at 
                                                          
3 Although market-based wholesale funding provides banks with greater flexibility, it may also increase susceptibility to market-
wide liquidity shocks (e.g., Acharya et al., 2013a; Allen and Gale, 2000; Huang and Ratnovski, 2011). One key reason is that 
uninsured wholesale creditors incur greater credit  risk and thus have more of incentive to promptly withdraw funds in stress 
scenarios  (e.g., during the asset-backed commercial paper crisis of August of 2007, see Acharya  et al., 2013b; Covitz et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, traditional deposit-based financing, which enjoys explicit government insurance, is a more reliable source of 
funds (Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Pennacchi, 2006). 
4 The market for bank loans can be broken down into two categories: the “primary” or “syndicated” loan market and the “seasoned” 
or “secondary” loan sales market. In the primary market, fractions of a loan are shared with a number of banks and other institutional 
investors during the loan origination process. An established literature examines various aspects of the primary market (for a survey, 
see Roberts and Sufi, 2009b). On the other hand, transactions in the secondary market involve a bank selling an existing 
participation in a loan (or the loan in its entirety) to another investor after origination (see Altman et al., 2010, for further discussion 
and institutional details).  
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$350bn in 2007.5 This development raises the question of how the presence of a deep and liquid secondary 
market for bank loans may have changed the traditional risk management task of banks. Indeed, the ability 
of banks to easily sell loan participations in the secondary market may create an additional source of liquidity 
that allows banks to better manage both bank-specific and market-wide liquidity shocks. 
In this paper, we examine bank liquidity risk management in the presence of a secondary loan market. 
We document how banks used loan sales to manage the market-wide liquidity shock that occurred during 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009.6 We find that banks with a greater exposure to the liquidity shock—as 
measured by wholesale funding dependence— were more likely to sell shares of syndicated loans in the 
secondary market to conserve liquidity. In doing so, we provide evidence of how banks use the secondary 
market to improve risk-sharing and better achieve their liquidity risk management goals through loan sales. 
Our empirical tests are based on a confidential credit register of U.S. syndicated loan commitments 
(including  both term loans  and  lines of credit), the Shared  National Credit Program, maintained by the 
Board of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the  Office 
of the Comptroller  of the Currency.7 This data set allows us to track the dynamics of loan share ownership 
in the years following origination. We use this data to identify sales of loan shares, which correspond to 
ownership transfers of shares of loan commitments occurring after origination, i.e., in the secondary market. 
To be precise, the central object of interest in our paper is the loan share sale, which is defined to occur 
whenever a U.S. bank holding company reduces its ownership stake—primarily, in its entirety—in a 
syndicated loan commitment in the current year relative to the previous year. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide aggregated evidence on loan share sales behavior by the U.S. commercial 
banking sector from 1994 until 2010. These figures present a considerable counter- cyclical variation in 
sales over this time horizon including peaks during the 2001 and 2007-2009 recessions.  Indeed, Figure 3.2 
                                                          
5 These authors also argue that trading in this market was resilient during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. For example, secondary 
market trading volume during 2008 was only about 7% lower than in 2007, while at the same time liquidity and trading in structured 
finance products froze. 
6 We also separately examine the impact of the secondary loan market on bank risk management and loan sales during the period 
from 2003–2006, i.e., a benign macroeconomic environment. 
7 A handful of recent papers use this data. Notably, Mian and Santos (2011) focus on liquidity risk management from the perspective 
of the borrower and examine bank loan refinancing behavior over the credit cycle. 
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indicates that from the trough in 2004 to the peak in 2009, the fraction of all loan shares sold (in their 
entirety) doubled from just above 6% to around 13%. In this paper, we use this comprehensive data source 
to shed light on the supply-side determinants of these syndicated loan sales. 
We link our data set on syndicated loan share ownership to bank-level balance sheet information to 
estimate the causal effect of liquidity risk management considerations, particularly wholesale funding 
dependence, on the loan sale decision during the financial crisis. We design our identification strategy to 
address a classic identification problem in the banking literature (for a discussion, see Khwaja and Mian, 
2008). In particular, in order to credibly identify a bank liquidity risk management motivation for loan sales 
we must adequately control for changes in credit demand by borrowers (e.g., unobservable changes in 
borrower default risk). We address this identification problem by using a loan-year fixed effects approach 
that exploits the multi-bank financing aspect of the syndicated loan market, as well as the complete 
information on loan share holdings and panel structure of our data set. Our approach accounts  for changes 
in borrower  investment  opportunities  and  risk at the loan syndicate level by comparing  the loan sale 
decision across participant lenders  as a function of wholesale funding dependence within a given loan 
syndicate-year pair8. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. We find that banks that were relatively more exposed to the 
market-wide liquidity shock had a higher probability of selling loan shares during the crisis. This relation is 
pervasive across all industry groupings and is independent of loan performance, providing strong evidence 
in favor of a bank-driven effect. 
We examine the timing of this effect and find that the positive relation between wholesale funding 
dependence and the likelihood of loan sales peaks in 2008, at the time when wholesale funding markets 
were most stressed (for example, see Acharya and Mora, 2013; Cornett et al., 2011). To provide additional 
evidence for a liquidity risk management motivation for loan sales, we examine the types of loans shares 
that were most likely to be sold and find that exposed banks were most likely to sell more liquid loans.  For 
                                                          
8 A closely-related borrower fixed effects approach has been applied to data from the U.S. syndicated loan primary market (see 
Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Lin and Paravisini, 2011). 
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example, the estimated effect of wholesale funding dependence on loan sales for term loans is almost twice 
the effect for credit lines.9 Next, we separately investigate the role of bank asset portfolio liquidity (e.g., 
cash holdings) on this relation and find the wholesale funding dependence effect persists. Finally, we 
conduct an analysis of credit risk management and its impact on loan sales and two notable results emerge.  
First, loan losses and insolvency risk (e.g., net charge offs and participation in the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, respectively) have a significant impact on loan sales during the crisis. Second, there is an 
independent and strong effect of wholesale funding dependence on loan sales during the crisis, even after 
we control for several established measures of default risk. Overall, these results suggest that banks exposed 
to the market-wide liquidity shock used the secondary loan market to conserve liquidity to meet their 
liquidity risk management goals. 
We also examine the supply-side determinants of loan sales in the relatively benign period from 2003 
until 2006.  We find robust evidence that bank capital constraints as well as the role of the bank in the 
lending syndicate are key factors impacting the loan sale decision. Finally, and in stark contrast to the crisis 
period, we find that banks with wholesale funding dependence are significantly less likely to sell loans 
during the period before the financial crisis, perhaps due to greater financial flexibility. This sharp contrast 
indicates that banks’ exposure through wholesale funding to the drying up of liquidity in the recent financial 
crisis was an important determinant of the increase in loan sales. 
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature, which we very briefly highlight here. First, there 
is an established literature on bank loan sales. These papers examine the motivations for loan sales from the 
perspective of the bank (e.g., as a function of the cost of capital, as in Parlour and Winton, 2013; Pennacchi, 
1988), as well as contracting features that must emerge to overcome informational issues and ensure that 
bank loans are marketable (Drucker and  Puri, 2009; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). Gande and Saunders 
(2012) show that, in recent years, borrowers’ shareholders have benefited from increased liquidity in the 
                                                          
9 Kashyap et al. (2002) show that deposit-taking commercial banks have a natural advantage at managing the liquidity risk 
associated with credit lines. This advantage is reflected by commercial banks retaining the bulk of these commitments when they 
are syndicated in the primary market, as compared to term loans which are held by a variety of financial intermediaries (Bord and 
Santos, 2012; Gatev and Strahan, 2009). 
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secondary loan market due to a relaxation of borrowers’ financial constraints. This is in contrast to earlier 
studies documenting a negative reaction of equity investors to loan sales, perhaps due to a negative signaling 
effect or a termination of the bank-borrower relationship (e.g., Dahiya et al., 2003). Our study advances this 
literature on the causes and consequences loan sales by providing new empirical evidence of a bank liquidity 
risk management motivation for loan sales. We do so using a unique sample of loan share sales from a 
regulatory data source that covers a long time horizon, which, importantly, includes the post-2000 period of 
rapid expansion of the secondary market for commercial bank loans. 
Second, our paper is related to recent work on bank liquidity risk management and wholesale funding 
dependence during the financial crisis. Acharya and Mora (2013) show that banks with a greater  exposure 
to the market-wide liquidity  shock increased deposit rates and  curtailed  loan supply  during  the crisis (see 
also Dagher and Kazimov, 2014). Cornett et al. (2011) show that U.S. commercial banks with wholesale 
funding dependence cut lending and  increased  cash  holdings  during  the crisis to preserve  liquidity. 
Acharya  et al. (2013a) show how banks with a greater  exposure to the asset-backed commercial  paper  
crisis during the  fall of 2007 adjusted their  liability  structure in an  attempt to  increase  their  liquidity. 
Similarly, Acharya and Merrouche (2013) show during the same period that UK settlement banks with a 
greater dependence on short term funding  hoarded liquidity in the interbank market for precautionary 
purposes, an effect that was virtually absent in the period before the  subprime  crisis. Our paper provides 
additional insights into how banks with a reliance on wholesale funding adjust their behavior during a period 
of market-wide stress when these sources dry up. In particular, we show that banks with greater wholesale 
funding dependence were able to sell loans in the secondary loan market in order to increase their liquidity.  
Thus, we provide empirical evidence of an alternative liquidity risk management tool at the disposal of 
commercial banks, a tool that was actively used during the recent financial crisis.10 
                                                          
10 Other papers that focus on how banks sought out liquidity through interbank markets and lender of last resort facilities during 
the recent financial crisis include, among many others, Acharya et al. (2014), Adrian et al. (2010), Afonso et al. (2011), Armantier 
et al. (2011), Campbell et al. (2011), Cassola et al. (2009), Drechsler et al. (2013), Duygan-Bump et al. (2013), Fleming et al. 
(2010), McAndrews and Wang (2008), and Wu (2011). 
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Third, our paper is related to the literature which examines how banks transmit balance sheet shocks to 
the cost and availability of corporate loans (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Recent empirical work 
investigating the role of bank liquidity and capital shocks includes Peek and Rosengren (1997), Khwaja and 
Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Chava and Purnanandam (2011), and 
Santos (2011). Most micro-level analyses of U.S. data tend to focus on the flow of new lending to the market, 
as opposed to the stock of existing loans. Our paper differs in that we show how banks rebalance their 
existing loan portfolio in response to a liquidity shock, as opposed to curtailing new lending to the market. 
In addition, our paper makes use of a U.S.-based credit register and adapts within-firm estimators used in 
the international banking literature to isolate a supply-side effect (in particular, see Jimenez et al., 2012; 
Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Schnabl, 2012). 
This rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the secondary loan market data. 
Section 3.3 develops the empirical framework. Section 3.4 presents the results. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
In this section we detail how we construct our sample and present summary statistics. We use two main 
data sets for our empirical analysis:  bank level data on U.S. bank holding companies and loan share-level 
data on syndicated loans provided by U.S. commercial banks to firms.  We obtain quarterly bank balance 
sheet data from Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Consolidated Financial 
Statements for Holding Companies (Form FR Y-9C). Every bank holding company must file these reports 
with the Federal Reserve.11 We collect loan share-level data from the Shared National Credit Program 
(SNC), an annual  survey  of syndicated loans carried  out  by the Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
and, until  recently, the Office of Thrift Supervision. 
                                                          
11 The Y9-C are almost identical to the Call Reports banks have to file with their primary regulator. The financial statement data 
are commonly used in the literature.  For detailed information on Call Reports, among many others, see (Cornett et al., 2011). Y9-
C data are available for download at the website of the FFIEC, see http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/nichome.aspx. 
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The SNC is a credit register of syndicated loans covering the period 1977 to present. The program 
obtains confidential information from administrative agent banks on all out-standing loans or loan 
commitments of at least $20 million in size that are shared by three or more unaffiliated federally supervised 
institutions, or a portion of which is sold to two or more such institutions. This includes loan packages 
containing two or more facilities to the same borrower for the same origination date where the total package 
of loans exceeds $20 million12,13 New and existing loans meeting this criteria are surveyed as of the 31st of 
December of each year. 
For each qualifying loan, information is provided about the identity of the borrower, as well as several 
terms of the contract including the origination date, the maturity date, the type of loan (e.g., credit line, term 
loan), the total loan amount at origination, the outstanding amount on the loan, the amount of the loan 
available to withdraw (i.e., unused amount in the case of a credit line), and the regulatory assessment of loan 
quality (pass/fail/criticized). One unique aspect of the SNC—of critical importance to our study—is that the 
data set provides complete information about all loan syndicate members for every year following 
origination. In particular, each year, the program reports the identity of the administrative agent bank 
(“agent”) and other participant lenders, as well as their respective shares of the outstanding loan 
commitment. 
Each loan in the SNC is assigned a unique credit identifier. This identifier remains unchanged in years 
when the loan terms are amended or the loan is refinanced. It is important to note two distinct advantages 
the SNC offers over other large and commonly used datasets of syndicated loans (e.g., the Reuters’ Loan 
Pricing Corporation Dealscan data set). First, it allows the researcher to track ownership of syndicated loan 
shares after they have been originated. In contrast, Dealscan, for example, provides a snapshot of loan 
                                                          
12 Information on the purpose of the SNC is provided at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/snc.htm and detailed 
information on guidelines for inclusion of a credit are provided at http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/reportingforms/-
guidelines.pdf. 
13 Notice that a syndicated loan may disappear from the SNC data set and therefore our sample if it fails to meet these criteria.  As 
we shall discuss later in Section 3.4, this potential sample selection is likely to attenuate our point estimates, if there is any impact 
at all.  See also Mian and Santos (2011) who argue that this sample selection issue is unlikely to impact their results in any obvious 
direction at all. 
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ownership at origination, i.e., in the primary market.14 Second, credits that are refinanced or amended do 
not appear as new originations in the SNC data. With Dealscan, amended or refinanced loans appear with a 
new credit identifier in many cases (for example, see Freudenberg et al., 2013; Roberts, 2012; Roberts and 
Sufi, 2009a). Unfortunately, this can lead to a double-counting problem that makes identifying the stock of 
outstanding loans to a given borrower difficult without further inspection of public filings.15 
For each year of the SNC and each loan, the data set has one observation per loan share, so that each 
observation can be identified as a loan share-lender-year triple. To ensure that this  identifier  is unique,  if 
a lender  holds  several  shares  of the  same  loan  in a given year  we aggregate  all shares  to arrive  at a 
total loan share-lender-year triple.  This occurs either because the same institution owns several shares of 
the same loan or because different institutions belong to the same bank holding company. This loan share-
lender-year is the unit of observation in our empirical analysis. 
In the case of U.S. commercial banks and their subsidiaries, the data identify the current holder of a loan 
share by the RSSD ID number and the ultimate parent (bank or financial holding company) of the lender, 
commonly referred to as the “top holder.” This paper focuses exclusively on these U.S. commercial banks 
and we conduct our regression analysis at the top holder level.  Lenders  belonging  to the  same bank  
holding company are assigned to a common top holder and considered  as a single “bank”  (for a similar 
approach, see also Acharya and Mora, 2013; Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Kashyap  et al., 2002). 
We use the SNC data set to track the dynamics of loan share ownership and identify sales of loan shares 
that occur after origination, i.e., ownership transfers that occur in the secondary market. We identify sales 
of loan shares on a loan-by-loan basis by comparing the set syndicate members between two consecutive 
years. In particular, if a lender is a member of a loan syndicate in year t but is not a member of the same 
                                                          
14 Bord  and  Santos (2012)  provide  evidence  that loans  are  distributed after origination   (also  see the secondary  loan market 
trading statistics provided  by the LSTA). 
15 As a consequence, when using Dealscan, it is problematic to identify the stock of syndicated bank loans to a given private 
borrower that does not provide any public filings. 
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loan syndicate in year t + 1, then we record a loan share sale for t + 1.16 We require that the loan has not 
matured in year t + 1 to avoid the problem of all lenders being coded as selling their participations at 
maturity. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the time-series averages of loan share sales in levels and fraction of the 
overall market, respectively. 
In some tests, we distinguish between loan-years in which there are no changes in the terms of the 
contract and loan-years in which the loan is refinanced or some terms of the loan were amended. In such 
cases the credit identifier will not change, so we pinpoint refinanced loans and loan amendments by observed 
changes in maturity dates, origination dates, or total loan amounts at origination. We label a loan share sale 
a “pure sale” in those cases where no contract term changes (or the loan is not refinanced) and we observe 
a sale. In our tests, we sometimes use a restricted sample “No Amend” where we consider only these loan-
years. This classification is imperfect, however, as the SNC data set does not contain sufficient information 
about some material contract terms including loan pricing. Figure 3.3 plots the time-series average of these 
pure sales, which closely resembles the overall trend in the market. 
The SNC data structure also allows us to control for merger and acquisition activity among banks and 
its potential for a misclassification of loan sales. Sales are identified on the lender level, typically a 
commercial bank subsidiary, and assigned to a top holder, which is usually a bank holding company. If the 
lender RSSD ID does not change but the top holder RSSD ID does change, we record this instance as a 
merger and not as sale.  For example, if bank holding company A acquires bank holding company B—and 
A consolidates their loan portfolio with B—then we do not record B’s disposal of loan shares as a sale in 
the year when the balance sheet consolidation takes place. Similarly, sometimes a loan share is transferred 
                                                          
16 For  simplicity,  our baseline  tests do not  include  partial loan sales, where a bank  reduces  but retains a positive share  of loan  
ownership  from one year  to the next.  In the data we observe such transactions occurring infrequently, particularly among 
participant lenders.   Nevertheless, such partial loan share sales may be important for the lead arranger who may be constrained 
from exiting the syndicate—perhaps due to reputation concerns—and may instead choose to reduce their exposure to a borrower.  
Along these lines, Bord and Santos (2012) provide evidence that, on average, lead arrangers reduce their ownership of term loans 
in the secondary market, particularly in the post-1994 period.  In Section 3.4.2.5 we show that our point estimates increase in 
magnitude when we include these partial sales, consistent with this interpretation. 
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from one lender to another lender, but both have the same top holder.  Such within-banking organization 
reallocations of loan shares are not recorded as sales.17 
We use data from the period 2002 until 2010. We define the “before crisis” period to be the years from 
2003 until 2006 and the “during crisis” period to be the years from 2007 until 2010.18 Table 3.1 provides 
the basic description of the SNC sample by lender type over a longer time horizon. Table 3.2 provides a 
summary of the SNC data used in our empirical analysis. This sample is restricted to loan shares held by 
U.S. commercial banks and includes 9,627 unique syndicated loans (67,647 loan share-lender-year triples) 
in the before crisis period and 9,599 loans (81,011 loan share-lender-year triples) in the during crisis period. 
Summary statistics of the loan and bank level variables are also included in this table.   Detailed definitions 
of these variables can be found in Appendix B. Bank level variables are from the FR Y-9C reports and are 
calculated at the top holder level and measured at the end of the calendar year.  These bank variables are 
also winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
Consistent with Figure 3.1, Table 3.2 indicates that the unconditional probability of a loan sale increases 
during the crisis, as compared to the before crisis period. In the following sections we examine the extent to 
which these loan sales are motivated by bank risk management considerations. 
 
3.3 Identification Strategy 
In this section, we describe how we use loan share-level data to estimate the impact of a market-wide 
liquidity shock on loan sales by U.S. commercial banks due to liquidity risk management considerations. 
This estimation poses a classic identification problem because it requires distinguishing between changes 
lending behavior due to supply-side factors (i.e., bank risk management), separately from changes in 
borrower investment opportunities and risk (credit demand). 
                                                          
17 Transfers of loan shares within the banking organization are interesting in their own right, but beyond the scope of the present 
study. 
18 In Table 3.8 we repeat our analysis on a year-by-year basis during the crisis period to shed light on the precise timing of banks’ 
adjustment in behavior. 
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This identification problem can be demonstrated with the following example. Suppose that banks with 
marginal funding coming from wholesale sources (“wholesale banks”) lend more to borrowers that have 
cyclical performance, such as those in the luxury goods industry. If the collapse in market-wide liquidity 
occurring at the onset of the crisis signals a coming recession then wholesale banks may be more willing to 
sell loan shares associated with their existing borrower pool due a lower expected performance and higher 
default risk. As a consequence, if we document a greater incidence of loan share sales among wholesale 
banks then this may reflect changes in default risk on the borrower side, as well as the outcome of bank 
liquidity risk management which we seek to identify. Indeed, any pattern of matching between firms and 
banks that correlates with credit demand during the crisis may contaminate the estimation of the supply-side 
impact of wholesale funding on loan share sales during the crisis. 
We design an empirical approach that allows us to address this identification problem directly. We 
exploit the fact that firms borrow from multiple banks in the syndicated loan market. Our approach accounts 
for changes in credit demand at the loan level by comparing the loan sale decision across participant lenders 
within a given loan syndication. This level of analysis allows us to control for potentially confounding 
demand factors at the level of the loan, rather than across loan relationships within firms or across firms. By 
doing so, we avoid the potential for having our estimates biased by  unobservable changes  in credit demand 
across firms and even across different loan types for a given firm.  To illustrate how our identification 
strategy works, suppose that a firm has a loan syndicate including bank A and bank B. Our estimation 
approach uses the loan share sale decision from bank A relative to  the  loan  share  sale decision  from  bank  
B for the  same  loan  syndicate. By using such within-loan variation, we control for loan-level credit demand 
shocks and thus identify the supply-side impact of bank wholesale funding on loan share sales. 
We carry out this identification strategy using ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the following 
baseline regression specification:19 
                                                          
19 We estimate this equation using a linear probability model to fit a binary dependent variable (BDV). In our setting, when N is 
large but T is fixed, a linear model yields estimates that are √N consistent whereas non-linear BDV (e.g., conditional probit) models 
generally produce inconsistent estimates (see Wooldridge, 2002).  
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Loan Saleijt = αit + β Wholesale Fundingj,2006Q4 + Xj,t-1 + εijt    (3.1) 
Where Loan Saleijt is the loan sale indicator variable that is equal to one if a loan share i held by bank j 
in year t-1 is sold in year t. The coefficient αit capture loan-year fixed effects.  Wholesale Fundingj,2006Q4 is 
our variable of interest, the wholesale funding exposure of bank  j, measured  as  of 2006:Q4. In the vector 
Xj,t-1, we control for other  potential determinants of the bank loan sale decision.20 The coefficient of interest 
is, which captures the transmission of the market-wide liquidity shock occurring during the 2007-2009 
financial crisis to bank loan sales after accounting for loan-specific changes in credit demand. The 
inclusion of loan-year fixed effects indicates that is identified using within-loan syndicate variation in 
a given year.21 
The main identifying assumption is that the expected reduction in borrowing by firms is evenly 
distributed across all lenders in the syndicate during the crisis. This assumption is plausible for two main 
reasons. First, the homogeneity of loan shares within a given syndicated credit: a loan share from participant 
lender A has identical contract terms as a loan share from participant lender B. Second, a key institutional 
feature of our setting is that borrowers have little influence over the composition of their loan syndicate, 
especially ownership changes occurring in the secondary market.22 While we have no reason to expect a 
borrower to remove a commercial bank from its loan syndicate solely for credit demand reasons, we are 
able to investigate this issue directly. Under  the assumption that it  is less easy to remove  a bank when a 
contract is not renegotiated or refinanced, we examine the impact of bank liquidity risk management on the 
                                                          
20 In some tests, we also include bank fixed effects to control for time-invariant and potentially unobservable characteristics at the 
bank level. Since bank fixed effects are collinear with the wholesale funding variable in Equation (1), in these tests we consider 
the 2003-2010 period and interact wholesale funding with a crisis indicator variable. 
21 Using loan-year fixed effects non-parametrically absorbs any year- and loan-specific effects. See Lin and Paravisini (2011) for 
a similar approach using primary market origination data from the U.S. syndicated loan market. Also see Khwaja and Mian (2008), 
Jimenez et al. (2012), and Schnabl (2012) for similar approaches using credit register data from Pakistan, Spain and Peru 
respectively. 
22 Inspection of U.S. syndicated credit contracts in the Dealscan data set, as well as conversations with bankers, indicates that the 
agreements may specify a minimum dollar amount of loan share sale, as well as a “black list” of lenders (e.g., certain investment 
funds) that excluded from participating in the loan syndicate. Such black lists are typically provided by the borrower to the lead 
arranger before the deal is structured in the primary market.  In addition, sometimes loan share sales in the secondary market may 
require approval of the administrative agent before any transaction takes place. While there has been little theoretical or empirical 
research into the motivation for such contractual provisions, we do not believe that these restrictions exist to enable a borrower to 
remove a commercial bank from their syndicate at will or to prevent a bank selling their loan share for risk management purposes. 
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incidence of loan sales in years where the contract is amended and in all other years  (i.e.,  the “No  Amend”  
sample  defined  in the previous section). 
We estimate the impact of bank liquidity risk management on the loan sale decision during the crisis 
using cross-sectional variation in banks’ dependence on wholesale funding. We capture this reliance on 
wholesale funding sources through the ratio of non-core funding (sum of large time deposits, foreign 
deposits, repo sold, other borrowed money, sub-ordinated debt, and fed funds purchased) to total assets. 
This is essentially the non-core liabilities to assets ratio reported by regulators (e.g., Uniform Bank 
Performance Report published by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) and used extensively in prior 
academic research (e.g., Acharya and Mora, 2013). This measure captures banks’ dependence on wholesale 
deposits as well as non-deposit funding, such as reverse repos, federal funds (interbank borrowing), and 
commercial  paper.23 
We measure wholesale funding dependence as of 2006:Q4 in order to address a secondary identification 
(omitted variables) problem that wholesale banks may have sold loans during the crisis for other reasons, 
such as concerns about bank insolvency.24 The idea behind this approach is that banks entering  the crisis 
with a greater  wholesale funding dependence  were more  likely to  affected  by  the liquidity  squeeze  
during  the crisis. Our second identifying assumption underlying this approach is that wholesale funding 
dependence just before the crisis affects the likelihood of loan sales only through liquidity management 
considerations, once we control for bank size and measures of insolvency and loan losses during the crisis. 
We include controls for loan and bank characteristics in our regressions. These controls are incorporated 
to ensure that the estimates are not contaminated by differences in loan or bank characteristics as a 
consequence of the liquidity shock. The loan level controls are defined at the loan-lender level and include 
the fraction of loan held by the lender and whether the lender is an agent bank.   The controls for bank 
                                                          
23 Our results are robust to different definitions of wholesale funding. 
24 Throughout our analysis we control for measures of bank insolvency and in Section 3.4.3 we investigate the impact of credit risk 
management considerations on loan sales. However, the purpose of this paper is to separately identify a liquidity management 
motivation for bank loan sales. Thus, we need to control for the potentiality confounding influence of other variables, including 
bank insolvency. 
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characteristics are lagged balance sheet variables such as various  measures  of bank  solvency including 
loan losses and bank capitalization (the equity ratio), the natural logarithm of assets, and whether  the bank 
has engaged in merger activity in the current and previous period (see discussion in Section 3.2 for a 
description of this variable). 
Controlling for losses and capitalization during the crisis is particularly important. Banks with access to 
wholesale funding are also likely to be money center banks that may have investment banking activities.  
These investment banking activities suffered relatively large losses during the crisis, so these banks suffered 
declines in the value of their capital. To restore their equity ratio these banks may choose to deleverage by 
simultaneously decreasing wholesale funding—the marginal source of funding—and selling of assets, 
including syndicated loans. Adrian and Shin (2010) provide evidence of such deleveraging behavior for 
standalone investment banks during the subprime crisis. While these authors do not find evidence of such 
behavior among U.S. commercial banks (see also Berrospide and Edge, 2010), they do not separately 
investigate the larger banks that are most likely to participate in the syndicated loan market. Hence, as we 
wish to separately identify the effect of wholesale funding constraints on loan sales, we must adequately 
control for losses due to nontraditional banking activities and changes in capitalization in our regressions. 
In the baseline regressions, the control variables are time-varying so their estimated coefficients should 
not be given a causal interpretation as they may be biased due to changes in variables because of the liquidity 
shock (for a similar approach, see Acharya and Mora, 2013). Moreover, these variables are lagged by one 
year to avoid contemporaneous changes occurring due to the loan sale decision. For instance, the 
nonperforming loan ratio could improve contemporaneously with a distressed loan sale.  In specification 
tests, we also measure the bank control variables in 2006:Q4 to avoid potential bias coming from changes 
in variables because of wholesale funding pressures during the financial crisis. 
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3.4 Results 
This section starts by investigating the bank-level  determinants of loan sales—including liquidity risk 
management and wholesale funding dependence—during the years immediately prior to the recent financial 
crisis (Section 3.4.1).  In Section 3.4.2, we conduct a similar analysis for the crisis period as well as a number 
of cross-sectional and robustness tests. We conclude our analysis by examining the role of loan losses and 
insolvency on bank loan sales (Section 3.4.3). 
3.4.1 Bank Liquidity Risk Management and Loan Sales During the 2003-2006 Period 
We first use data from the period before the financial crisis to examine the impact of liquidity risk 
management considerations on loan sales outside of a period of market-wide stress. This analysis will 
provide us with insights on the supply-side determinants of bank loan sales, including the role of banks’ 
liability structure and access to wholesale funding markets. In addition, this section will provide a 
benchmark against which bank loan sale behavior during the financial crisis can be compared. 
The period from 2003 until 2006 was characterized as a period of low macroeconomic volatility, credit 
expansion, and few corporate defaults. In such a benign macroeconomic environment, if wholesale funding 
markets (e.g., interbank lending) are well-functioning then banks experiencing liquidity shortages will have 
no need to sell loans in order to raise cash. Indeed, banks able to tap wholesale funding markets may have 
greater flexibility in terms of access to funds as well as a lower cost of funds,  potentially reducing  the need 
to sell loans as compared  to other banks. Accordingly, we expect the relation between wholesale funding 
dependence and loan sales to be non-positive in the benign period before the financial crisis. 
To investigate the supply-side determinants of bank loan sales during this period, we modify the 
empirical approach outlined in the previous section by shifting the timing of the event window. Wholesale 
funding dependence is measured at the beginning of the period, i.e., 2002:Q4, and we conduct the benchmark 
estimation of model (3.1) for the “before crisis” sample period from 2003 until 2006. 
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Table 3.3 presents the results. Column [1] indicates that the coefficient on the wholesale funding variable 
is negative and significant at the 5% level. The sign of this estimate implies that banks with greater use of 
wholesale funding have a lower probability of selling loan shares   during this period. 
Columns [2]–[6] consider several variants of this benchmark estimation to check for robustness. Column 
[2] restricts the sample to loans with fewer than 250 syndicate members. These very large syndicates 
comprise a relatively small fraction of the sample (less than 50 loans),  however they  may  behave  
differently  to traditional  syndicates  during  normal  times or times of stress.  Column [2] indicates that 
dropping the large syndicates from the sample does not have any noticeable effect on any of the coefficient 
estimates.25 
Column [3] restricts the sample to loan years in which the contract was not amended or refinanced and 
continues to provide evidence in line with our expectation. While the point estimate becomes statistically 
insignificant and attenuated towards zero when we remove amended contracts from the sample (about 2,500 
loans), is still has a non-positive sign. 
Column [4] uses a longer time horizon and calculates the average of wholesale funding dependence 
across the four quarters in 2002, instead of the 2002:Q4 value. We find similar effects as the benchmark 
estimation using this alternative timing. 
Column [5] allows wholesale funding to become time-varying throughout the crisis period by including 
the lagged value in the baseline specification instead of using the data from 2002:Q4. This approach 
complements the exposure measure used in the benchmark estimation as it incorporates within-bank 
variation in wholesale funding dependence. Column [5] shows that the coefficient of interest increases in 
magnitude and remains highly statistically significant after switching to this dynamic specification. 
Column [6] uses total deposits as of 2002:Q4 as an alternative measure of wholesale funding dependence 
and repeats the same test. We find the point estimate on the coefficient of interest is small and statistically 
                                                          
25 The choice of 250 lenders is arbitrary and similar results emerge when we consider other cutoffs for large syndicates (200,150, 
etc.).  The median syndicate size is eight in our sample. 
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insignificant. Thus, using this alternative measure, we find banks with a lesser reliance on wholesale funding 
have a similar propensity to sell loans than other banks. 
Columns [1]–[6] also control for bank characteristics. Several important and robust relations emerge 
that are worthwhile mentioning. First, the book capital ratio has strong predictive power for loan sales.  In 
each column, we find that the coefficient on the capital ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level. This indicates that a well- capitalized bank is less likely to sell a loan share, all else equal, during 
normal times. This finding corroborates the theory that binding regulatory capital requirements may induce 
banks to push credit risk of their balance sheets through loan sales (Pennacchi, 1988). Second, larger banks 
are less likely to sell loan shares during the crisis on average, as indicated by the negative and highly 
significant coefficient on the bank size variable. This point estimate is in line with expectation as larger 
banks are considered more able to handle liquidity shocks by accessing alternative sources of funding (see 
Acharya et al., 2013a). The lagged bank merger variables indicate that loan share sales were more likely to 
occur following a merger between two bank holding companies, consistent with portfolio rebalancing 
activity. Regarding the lenders’ role in the syndicate, we find that when the lender is an agent bank or retains 
a large portion of the loan, they are less likely to sell their share. This finding is consistent with a bank acting 
as lead arranger being less inclined to sell their fraction of the loan retained at origination, perhaps due 
relationship banking effects or reputation concerns (see Bharath et al., 2007; Lin and Paravisini, 2011; Sufi, 
2007). 
Taking these results together, we draw two main conclusions. First, when wholesale funding markets 
are well-functioning, we find that banks using wholesale funding sources having a lower propensity to sell 
loan shares relative to other banks. Indeed, we find robust evidence that banks accessing wholesale funding 
markets were less likely to sell loans in the 2003–2006 period, consistent with these banks having greater 
financial flexibility. Second, we find that other considerations that have been emphasized in the literature—
such as regulatory capital constraints or the role of the bank in the lending syndicate—appear to play an 
important role during normal times. 
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3.4.2 Bank Liquidity Risk Management and Loan Sales During the 2007-2010 Period 
Having documented the supply-side determinants of bank loan sales during normal times, we now 
examine the impact of wholesale funding dependence and bank liquidity risk management during a period 
characterized by financial crisis. We use the same approach as in the previous section, but here wholesale 
funding dependence is measured using data from 2006:Q4. 
Table 3.4 provides the main results. The first column shows the results from the bench- mark estimation 
of Equation (1), including the full sample of loan shares held by U.S. bank holding companies during the 
financial crisis period from 2007 until 2010. The coefficient on the wholesale funding variable is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. The direction of this estimate is consistent with our expectation that banks 
exposed to the market-wide liquidity shock had a greater probability of selling loan shares to meet their 
liquidity risk management goals. Regarding economic magnitudes, the estimate implies that increasing 
wholesale funding by one standard deviation (this is, roughly, a 0.14 increase in wholesale funding) is 
associated with a 1.1% higher probability of a loan sale during the crisis, when we hold everything else 
constant. The magnitude of this relation is large given that the frequency of loan sales was on average around 
three percentage point higher during the crisis as compared to before (as shown in Table 3.2). In what 
follows, when we examine the timing of loan sales as well as the types of bank loans that are sold, we shall 
see the magnitude of this estimate will increase substantially. 
Columns [2]–[6] consider several variants of this benchmark estimation to check for robustness. We 
implement the identical set of tests from Section 3.4.1. Column [2] restricts the sample to loans with fewer 
than 250 syndicate members and shows that dropping these large syndicates does not impact any of the 
coefficient estimates in terms of magnitudes or statistical significance. 
Column [3] restricts the sample to loan years in which the contract was not amended or refinanced. As 
described in detail in Section 3.2, a loan-year and all corresponding shares are dropped from the sample if 
there was any refinancing or contract amendment activity during the year. Such activity is identified, for a 
given credit identifier, using a change in the origination date or some other contract term (maturity, loan 
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amount, etc.). Notice, however, that the presence of renegotiated loan contracts in our benchmark sample 
should not compromise the internal validity of our estimates. Since, our identification strategy uses within-
loan syndicate variation in bank wholesale funding dependence, we are able to control for all changes in the 
condition of the borrower that may motivate a loan sale. Put simply, all banks in the syndicate will observe 
the same change in borrower condition leading to the contract renegotiation and therefore the decision for 
any one bank to drop out of the syndicate (relative to the decision of other syndicate  members) should be a 
reflection of that bank’s own characteristics, including their liquidity risk  management considerations. 
Column [3] provides strong evidence in support of this assertion: the coefficient estimates remain unchanged 
in both magnitude and significance when we remove renegotiated and refinanced loans from the sample 
(about 2,000 loans). 
Column [4] uses a longer time horizon and calculates the average of wholesale funding dependence 
across the four quarters in 2006, instead of the 2006:Q4 value. While it is unlikely that banks adjusted their 
funding position in anticipation of a financial crisis,26 we now consider this different timing for the 
measurement of wholesale funding. We find similar effects as the benchmark estimation using this 
alternative timing. 
Column [5] allows wholesale funding to become time-varying throughout the crisis period by  including  
the  lagged  value  in the  baseline  specification  instead  of using  the  data from 2006:Q4. This approach 
complements the exposure measure used in the benchmark estimation as it incorporates within-bank 
variation in wholesale funding dependence. Column [5] shows that the coefficient of interest increases 
slightly in magnitude and remains highly statistically significant after switching to this dynamic 
specification. 
                                                          
26 There was no evidence that banks adjusted their funding position in 2006 due to concerns about an impending financial crisis. 
The crisis arguably began with a series of announcements of problems in the subprime mortgage market (see Acharya et al., 2013c). 
While media outlets and  some market participants voiced concerned  about banks’ financial  condition prior  to the crisis,  all 
standard indicators  of bank  risk implied  a low likelihood  of a financial  crisis.   For  instance, all major  U.S. and  Eurozone  
banks  had  CDS spreads  that were consistent with a low probability of bank failure and did not show any meaningful  run up in 
2006 (see Acharya  et al., 2013b; Giglio, 2013). 
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Column [6] uses total deposits as of 2006:Q4 as an alternative measure of funding constraints. Banks 
with greater  reliance on deposits, core deposits in particular, are less likely to be vulnerable  to market-wide 
liquidity shocks that impact access to funding because depositor demand  is less elastic (Acharya et al., 
2013a; Cornett et al., 2011; Dagher and Kazimov, 2014). We re-estimate the baseline specification and find 
the coefficient on deposits to be negative although statistically insignificant. This finding is consistent with 
our expectation that banks with more stable sources of funding were less likely to sell loan shares for 
liquidity risk management purposes, holding all else constant. 
Columns [1]–[6] continue to control for the same set of bank characteristics as in the previous section. 
Many of the relations emerging in normal times remain robust during the financial crisis, notably, the 
lenders’ role in the syndicate. We continue to find robust evidence that when the lender is an agent bank or 
retains a large portion of the loan, they are less likely to sell their share.27 We also find that the loan loss 
variables (NPL ratio and net charge offs) are important determinants of the loan sale decision during the 
crisis, whereas the book capital ratio appears to be less important. In Section 3.4.3 we will revisit the issue 
of bank insolvency and credit risk management in more detail. 
When we compare this finding with the relation we estimated for the before crisis period (see Table 3.3), 
we find strong evidence of an adjustment in the behavior of wholesale banks during the crisis, occurring in 
response to a market-wide liquidity shock. This rules out an alternative explanation that wholesale banks 
have a greater propensity to sell loans throughout the credit cycle. 
3.4.2.1 Results by Industry Grouping and Credit Quality 
We next examine the impact of the market-wide liquidity shock by borrower industry as well as loan 
credit quality. We investigate whether the estimated effect of wholesale funding dependence on loan sales 
is concentrated in a particular industry. To this end, we first estimate the main specification separately for 
                                                          
27 We conduct two further tests to examine the impact of syndicate membership on the loan sale decision. First, we interact an 
indicator variable for agent bank status (equal to one if the bank is the lead arranger) with wholesale funding variable.  We find 
that the effect of being an agent bank entirely offsets the greater probability of a loan sale associated with wholesale funding during 
the crisis. Second, we re-estimate Equation(1) separately on the sample  of participant banks  and  find similar  point  estimate  on 
wholesale funding  as in Column  [1] of Table  3.4. This confirms that our estimates are not due to wholesale banks sorting into the 
participant role within lending syndicates.  These results are unreported and are available upon request. 
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each of the largest industry groupings that are provided by the SNC. We continue to include loan-year fixed 
effects and the same set of control variables in the regressions. If our results capture changes in investment 
opportunities in a particular sector, say, real estate construction, then we may expect a the effect to be 
concentrated in this industry.28 
Table 3.5 presents the results. Column [1] shows the coefficient on wholesale funding dependence from 
the baseline estimation, for ease of comparison. Columns [2]–[6] show the propensity to sell across the four 
largest industry groups and the remaining groups collectively. We find the relation between wholesale 
funding and loan sales is positive and statistically significant at least the 5% level across all industry groups. 
The coefficient is slightly smaller than the baseline effect in the agriculture and mining industry, and about 
50% larger in the financial services industry. Hence, there is no evidence that the results in Table 3.4 can be 
explained only by one industry group. We instead find that the effects are large and positive across all 
industries, which suggests other factors (such as loan liquidity) may drive a differential propensity for banks 
to sell loans across loan or borrower types. 
Next, we investigate the role of credit quality. We estimate our baseline specification separately on loan-
year observations classified as “pass” and those classified as “fail” by the annual SNC Review.   Loans are 
classified as fail if they are criticized or classified in any way by the examiner, which means they are either 
in default (and are soon to be charged off), non-accrual, doubtful, substandard, or special mention. The latter 
three categories are assigned at the discretion of the examiner and are intended to reflect deficiencies in 
repayment prospects of the borrower or quality of pledged collateral (see SNC, 2013). We do not have a 
prior as to whether banks with a greater wholesale funding dependence will be more likely to sell high or 
low credit quality loans. On the one hand, there may be more demand for the less risky, high quality loans. 
On the other hand, we know that distressed loan trading increased during the crisis (Gande and Saunders, 
2012), so it might be the case that banks exposed to the funding shock find it easier to sell poor credit quality 
loans albeit at a discount relative to par. 
                                                          
28 Since our estimation approach uses within loan variation in loan share shares, our estimates will still be capturing a supply-side 
effect.  It is nevertheless interesting to check to see if this supply-side effect interacts with industry grouping in a systematic way. 
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Columns [7] and [8] show the results by the pass or fail classification. We find similar point estimate of 
0.076 and 0.078 for the pass and fail subsamples, respectively, which is essentially the same as the 0.076 
baseline estimate. The results show that there is no greater propensity for banks with a greater reliance on 
wholesale funding to sell performing versus non-performing loans, on average. One possible reason for this 
is that non-performing loans are no less liquid than performing loans, due to specialized funds providing 
liquidity during the financial crisis. In the next section, we instead directly focus on loan liquidity and check 
to see if these loans are sold more often after the market-wide liquidity shock. 
3.4.2.2 The Impact of Bank Loan Liquidity on Loan Sales 
We now examine the role of loan liquidity on loan sales during the crisis. The key question we seek to 
answer in this section is: which types of loans would the banks that were more dependent on wholesale 
funding choose to sell? On the one hand, hesitant to sell the more illiquid assets at fire sale prices and book 
significant losses, banks may prefer to sell their more liquid loan shares, i.e., loan shares with more potential 
trading partners in the secondary market. On the other, banks facing uncertainty may value  keeping some 
liquidity cushion in their portfolios to insure against  future liquidity needs and choose to sell less liquid 
loan shares first (Brown  et al., 2010; Manconi et al., 2012; Scholes, 2000). Motivated by recent research on 
bank loan trading (particularly, Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2009), we consider four proxies for 
loan liquidity measured as of 2006:Q4 loan type, borrower size, whether the loan is securitized or not, and 
syndicate size. Table 3.6 presents the results. 
We first estimate our baseline specification separately for credit lines and term loans. The SNC identifies 
each loan as belonging to one of these two categories and we partition our sample accordingly. Commercial 
banks have a comparative advantage at managing the liquidity risk associated with credit lines (Kashyap et 
al., 2002), which is reflected in their holdings the majority of these commitments when they are syndicated 
in the primary market (Gatev and Strahan, 2006, 2009). Consequently, there is less depth in secondary 
market for credit lines (i.e., there are fewer potential buyers), in contrast to the market for term loans where 
banks and virtually every type of investment fund is an active participant (see Bord and Santos, 2012). Thus, 
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if banks prefer to sell liquid assets after the liquidity shock then we will be more likely to observe term loan 
share sales as compared to credit lines sales. 
Columns [1] and [2] show the results. We continue to include loan-year fixed effects and the full set of 
bank and loan controls in the regressions. The coefficient estimates are 0.058 and 0.097 for credit lines and 
term loans, respectively. Both point estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.  The results indicate 
that banks with a greater exposure to the market-wide liquidity shock have a greater propensity to sell term 
loans relative to credit lines. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that banks with a greater reliance 
on wholesale funding prefer to sell more liquid term loans so as to avoid fire sales on credit lines. 
Next, we estimate the regressions separately by borrower size because studies find that small firms 
borrowing the syndicated loan market are more informationally opaque (Sufi, 2007), and thus less likely to 
be actively traded in the secondary market (Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2009). Indeed, many of the 
smaller borrowers in the SNC data set are private firms and likely subject to an adverse selection problem 
if a bank tried to liquidate their holdings at short notice. If banks prefer to sell liquid assets after the liquidity 
shock then we expect stronger effects for large borrowers because they are more transparent, which makes 
them less likely to suffer from such an adverse selection problem and easier for banks to sell these loan 
shares. We define a firm as large if its loan size is above the upper quartile of $300m and small if it is below 
the lower quartile of $50m.  
Columns [3] and [4] provide the results by borrower size. We find that the coefficient on the wholesale 
funding variable is positive is positive for small borrowers, however, it is not statistically significant. The 
coefficient on the wholesale funding variable is positive, larger in magnitude, and significant at the 1% for 
large borrowers. 
Our final two tests consider whether a loan is securitized or not and syndicate size. Securitized loans 
must be of sufficient quality and transparency (e.g., they will have an external credit rating) and include 
contractual features that make them easier to trade, such as more financial covenants. We classify a loan 
share as securitized if its syndicate contains a collateralized loan obligation in the current year or not 
securitized otherwise. Loan shares from syndicates featuring more lenders may be easier to sell as one of 
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the other lenders in the syndicate may be willing to take up the share. Alternatively, the share may have 
desirable properties that lead to more lenders holding it in the first place. The basic idea of these two tests 
is the same as before: we wish to test if banks with more wholesale funding were more likely to dispose of 
more liquid loans or not. We classify a syndicate as large if it contains greater than the median number of 
lenders (eight) and small otherwise. 
Columns [5] and [6] report the result by securitized status. We find that the coefficient on wholesale 
funding is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both subsamples, but the estimate for the 
securitized group is more than twice the size as compared to the non-securitized group.29 Columns [7] and 
[8] find a similar pattern when comparing large and small loan syndicates. We find a positive and statistically 
significant relation between wholesale funding dependence and loan sales during the crisis and this effect is 
greater in magnitude for syndicates featuring a large number of lenders. 
3.4.2.3 The Role of Asset Liquidity Risk 
In this section, we examine how the composition of banks’ asset portfolios—the market liquidity of 
banks’ assets—impacts loan sales during the crisis. In traditional models of financial intermediation, banks 
raise equity and carry liquid assets to manage the risk of cash shortfalls stemming from unexpected demand 
from borrowers or creditors (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990). These liquid 
assets generally correspond to cash reserves and debt securities, and such holdings are a key component of 
liquidity risk management for banks. In general, we expect banks with more liquid asset portfolios to sell 
fewer loans during the crisis because it may be less costly for them to use cash reserves or liquidate debt 
securities instead. 
Table 3.7 presents the results. Liquid assets are defined as the ratio of cash (including repos and Federal 
Funds sold) and debt securities (excluding mortgage- and asset-backed securities) to total bank assets, along 
the lines of Acharya and Mora (2013). All columns Include controls for loan-year fixed effects and the full 
set of loan and bank controls. Column [1] shows the baseline estimate on the full sample from Table 3.4, 
                                                          
29 The results are quantitatively similar if we include only term loans in this test. The rationale for doing so is that credit lines tend 
not to be purchased by collateralized loan obligations (for example, see Benmelech et al., 2012). 
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for ease of comparison. Column [2] appends the benchmark specification (1) to include the liquid assets 
ratio measured as of 2006:Q4. We find that liquid asset ratio has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on loan sales during the crisis: banks with more liquid asset portfolios are less likely to sell loans. 
This effect does not drive out the magnitude or statistical significance of the wholesale funding dependence 
coefficient.  Indeed, the magnitude of the coefficient on whole-sale funding increases from 0.076 (in the 
benchmark estimation) to 0.101 when we include liquid assets in the regression.  
Columns [3] and [4] further check the robustness of this result. Column [3] drops loan syndicates with 
greater than 250 lenders from the sample. We find that dropping the largest syndicates from the sample does 
not have any noticeable effect on either of the coefficient estimates of interest. Column [4] restricts the 
sample to loan-years in which loan contracts were not amended or refinanced and once more we find that 
the coefficient estimates remain stable in magnitude and precision. The wholesale funding coefficient 
remains significant at the 1% level across both specifications. 
Next, we additionally include the interaction of wholesale funding dependence and liquid assets in the 
regression. Doing so allows us to test the joint effect of wholesale funding dependence and banks’ asset 
liquidity on loan sales. If banks hold a lot of cash then we would expect this to mitigate the positive impact 
of wholesale funding dependence on loan sales during the crisis. This would translate into a negative 
coefficient on this interaction term. 
Columns [5] to [7] present the results of including the interaction of wholesale funding dependence and 
liquid assets for the full sample, excluding large syndicates, and excluding amended loans, respectively. 
Column [5] indicates that the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative and statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Thus, for a given level of wholesale funding dependence, we find that an increase in liquid 
assets reduces the propensity to sell loans during the crisis consistent with a liquid asset portfolio mitigating 
the effects of the liquidity shock. Column [6] shows that this remains to be true when we exclude very large 
syndicates from the sample. Column [7] indicates that this effect is only present for amended loan contracts 
and that while the estimate has the expected sign, it is not statistically significant in the pure loan sales 
subsample. 
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Overall, the results in this section indicate that liquidity management stemming from both the asset  and 
liability side of the balance sheet had independent effects on bank loan sales during the crisis (see also 
Cornett et al., 2011). 
3.4.2.4 Dynamics of Bank Liquidity Risk Management and Loan Sales 
In the benchmark estimation, the crisis period was defined as the years from 2007 until 2010. The 
coefficient estimates in Table 3.4 capture a time-averaged estimate across this event window.  In this section, 
we examine the relation between wholesale funding and loan sales on a year-by-year basis during the crisis 
by estimating the baseline model separately on each crisis year. 
Table 3.8 provides the results. Panel A excludes the liquid assets ratio from the regression model. Panel 
B includes the liquid assets ratio. Column [1] shows the coefficient estimates from the baseline regression 
model in Table 3.4, for ease of comparison. Columns [2]–[5], re-estimate this model separately for the years 
from 2007 until 2010, respectively. Each of these columns include controls for loan-year fixed effects and 
the full set of loan and bank controls. 
Examining the coefficients on wholesale funding dependence across these two panels, we find a hump-
shaped pattern in the point estimates. Panel A indicates that from the end of 2007 to the end of 2008 the 
point estimate increases by more than a factor of three, from 0.048 to 0.181. From the end of 2008 to the 
end of 2009, this pattern sharply reverses and the point estimate decreases 0.181 to -0.016. The statistical 
significance of the point estimates increases from 10% in 2007 to 1% in 2008, and then the point estimate 
becomes insignificant. Panel B shows that controlling for the bank liquid asset ratio does not change this 
pattern: the effect of wholesale funding dependence on loan sales peaks in 2008 and drop of thereafter. 
Regarding the economic magnitude of this relation, in 2008 the estimate becomes as large as a one standard 
deviation increase in wholesale funding being associated with a 4.2% increase in the likelihood of a loan 
sale (up from 1.1% in the benchmark estimation).30 
                                                          
30 Regarding the relation between wholesale funding and loan sales in 2010, we find that the coefficient on wholesale funding is 
still positive.  The point estimate is not statistically significant once we control for the liquid assets ratio. Thus, for the years 2009 
and 2010 we find the relation is statistically insignificant in three out of four cases.  We believe that measurement error in using 
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We interpret these findings in the context of the squeeze in wholesale funding markets that occurred 
during the financial crisis. Among others Acharya and Mora (2013) and Cornett et al. (2011) use the TED  
spread—the difference between the 3-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the 3-month  
Treasury rate—to infer the depth of the market-liquidity  shock during  the crisis. High levels of the TED 
spread  is commonly  understood to reflect  greater  risks associated  with  short-term  lending  to banks,  
therefore  indicating a worsening  of conditions  in banks’ access to wholesale funding. Figure 3.4 shows 
the time series of the TED spread for the period from 2002 until 2010. In the summer of 2007—widely 
accepted as the onset of the financial crisis—the TED spread jumped up from around 0.5% to elevated  
levels between 1% and 2.5%. It remained at these elevated levels until shortly after the Lehman bankruptcy, 
when the spread peaked at around 5.8%. From this peak, the spread declined through the second half of 
2008 and by the end of 2009 it had returned to 0.5%. Thus, we find a time variation in the relation between 
wholesale funding dependence and bank loan sales that corresponds to shifts in liquidity during the crisis.  
3.4.2.5 Additional Robustness Tests 
In this section, we conduct several specification tests. One possible concern with our base- line 
estimation is that it imposes a linear relationship between wholesale funding dependence and loan sales and 
estimation of this relationship may be sensitive to outliers. Throughout the analysis we address concerns of 
outliers by winsorizing our bank-level variables, including wholesale funding dependence, and we now 
consider an alternative estimation approach that does not impose linearity. 
To allow for a nonlinear relation between wholesale funding dependence and loan sales, we rank banks 
as having high, medium, and low exposure to the liquidity shock. Banks are assigned to exposure groups 
depending on the tercile wholesale funding dependence distribution that the bank falls into using data from 
2006:Q4. We then run the following variant of the baseline regression model (3.1) 
Loan Saleijt = αit + β1 Medium Exposurej,2006Q4 + β2 High Exposurej,2006Q4 + γ Xj,t-1 + εijt   (3.2) 
                                                          
2006:Q4 values of wholesale funding may play a role. For robustness, we repeat the analysis defining the years 2007-2009 as the 
crisis period and we find the estimates are very similar in both magnitude and significance. 
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where,  as before,  Loan Saleijt   is the loan sale indicator  variable  that is equal to one if a loan  share i 
held by bank j in year t-1 is sold in year t, αit capture loan-year fixed effects, and  Xj,t-1 includes controls for 
other potential determinants of the bank loan sale decision. The exposure variables are indicator variables 
that classify the commercial banks into exposure groups. The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2, which 
captures the impact of the liquidity shock occurring during crisis to bank loan sales after accounting for 
loan-specific changes in credit demand. Here, β1 measures the average propensity of banks in the medium 
exposure group to sell loans relative the omitted group, which is comprised of the low exposure banks. And 
similarly for β2. 
Panel A of Table 3.9 presents the results. Column [1] estimates model (3.2) on the full sample of loan sales. 
We find that medium and high exposure banks increase their likelihood of selling their loan share by 0.8% and 
1.5%, respectively, relative to low exposure banks. These estimates are statistically significant at the 5% and 
1% level, respectively. The results of this nonlinear specification mirror that of the baseline estimation: banks 
with a greater reliance on wholesale funding had a greater likelihood of selling loans during the financial crisis. 
Columns [2] and [3] repeat the estimation for different samples. Using these alternative samples, we find 
the coefficient on the medium exposure indicator variable becomes smaller in magnitude and is no longer 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the high exposure indicator remains large in magnitude and highly 
significant. Column [4] repeats the analysis using the average value of wholesale funding dependence in 2006 
to construct the exposure indicator variables and the same pattern emerges. This additional tests indicate that 
a robust positive relation between wholesale funding dependence at the onset of the crisis and loan sales from 
2007 until 2010, primarily among the high exposure banks. 
We next include partial loan sales in the analysis. The loan sale variable that we have examined so far only 
includes the complete sale of a loan share by a bank holding company. This choice was motivated by the fact 
that we observe partial sales of loan shares occurring infrequently. Nevertheless, a possible concern is that 
omitting such partial sales by classifying them as non-sales may introduce measurement error into the analysis 
and bias our estimates. For instance, a bank  that was more dependent on wholesale funding  may choose to 
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reduce its exposure to a given syndicated  loan by selling only 50% of their  existing  share,  rather than 100%. 
This would lead us to underestimate of in baseline regression model (3.1). 
We check to see if this is an issue by redefining our loan sale variable to be equal to one if any reduction in 
the loan share is observed from year t to year t + 1 and re-estimating the baseline model. Panel B of Table 3.9 
shows the results. Each column includes the full set of controls for loan-year fixed effects, as well as bank and 
loan control variables. Columns [1]–[4] present a very similar picture to the main results in Table 3.4.  The 
magnitude of the coefficients appears to be slightly larger in each column, relative to the baseline results, 
suggesting that banks may use partial sales to alleviate funding constraints. This suggests that our baseline 
estimates, which focus on complete loan sales, may slightly underestimate the true effect. 
We also conduct a specification test that groups the before and during crisis periods together (i.e., 2003-
2010) and runs a single estimation on a full sample of loans. Here, we measure wholesale funding dependence 
at the bank level using data from 2002:Q4. We include an interaction term to account for the differential impact 
of wholesale funding dependence in normal and stress scenarios. The panel regression specification we 
implement is as follows 
Loan Saleijt = αit + β1 Wholesale  Fundingj,2002Q4     (3.3) 
+ β2 Crisist×Wholesale Fundingj,2002Q4 + γ Xj,t-1 + εijt 
where Crisist is an indicator variable equal  to one if the year  is between  2007 and 2010. The estimates of 
β1 and β2 and their difference are of interest. We continue to control for bank and loan variables that are 
determinants of the loan sale decision, as well as the full set of loan-year fixed effects.31 In a separate test, we 
also include bank fixed effects in this specification to control for unobserved time-invariant differences 
between banks. Inclusion of bank  fixed effects  sweeps out  the  main  wholesale funding  term,  as this  is 
collinear  with the bank  fixed effect. 
Panel C of Table 3.9 presents the results. Column [1] conducts a preliminary test that restricts the sample to 
the loan years from 2007 until 2010, which corresponds to the crisis period for our baseline tests. We find that 
                                                          
31 Note that the inclusion of loan-year fixed effects eliminates the need to include year fixed effects in (3.3). 
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wholesale funding measured in 2002:Q4 has a positive and statistically significant impact on loan sales during 
the crisis. This follows quite naturally from the stickiness of the wholesale funding variable at the bank level. 
Columns [2] and [3] consider the longer event window from 2003 until 2010 and includes a crisis interaction 
term. Column [2] shows that the effect of wholesale funding dependence on loan sales is positive and 
statistically significant in the crisis period only. The coefficient on the main effect is negative—suggesting that 
wholesale funding may have improved financial flexibility in the 2003-2006 period—although this effect is 
small in magnitude and not statistically significant.  Column [3] adds controls for bank fixed effects and finds 
similar results. 
Next, we replace the crisis term with a continuous measure of the tightness of banks’ funding liquidity 
conditions, the TED spread. As mentioned in the previous section, we measure the TED spread as the yearly 
average of the daily difference between the three month LIBOR and the three month U.S. Treasury rate. 
This test is based on the idea that banks with greater dependence on wholesale funds will be more  likely to 
sell loans to conserve liquidity, as compared to banks with stable sources of funding, when the TED spread 
increases (for a similar approach, see Cornett et al., 2011). Figure 3.4 indicates that the TED spread peaked 
in 2008, but also shows considerable time-series variation from year-to- year. Columns [4] and [5] of Table 
3.9 show that the results remain similar when we use the TED spread as a continuous  measure of wholesale 
funding conditions, whether we include bank fixed effects or not. 
In a final specification test, we re-estimate the baseline regression model (3.1) during the crisis 
measuring the bank control using data from 2006:Q4. This test alleviates concerns that our estimates are 
potentially biased by changes in control variables occurring due to wholesale funding pressures in the 
financial crisis. Panel D of Table 3.9 shows the results of this estimation. Columns [1]–[5] repeat the same 
tests as in the main analysis, but using this alternative measurement of the bank characteristics. We find that 
the coefficient on wholesale funding remains positive and statistically significant using this alternative 
approach. 
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In sum, the results of this section established a strong link between bank liquidity risk management and 
loan sales. Banks that were more exposed to liquidity shock through larger wholesale funding dependence 
were more likely to sell loans when wholesale funding markets came under pressure. 
3.4.3 Loan losses, Insolvency, and Loan Sales 
This section examines the role of bank insolvency and credit risk management on loan sales during the 
crisis. The crisis was characterized by many bank failures, government interventions, and several of the 
largest banks booking substantial losses related with their mortgage businesses.32 Banks that experienced 
large losses were undoubtedly perceived as riskier prospects and, consequently, their cost of funding likely 
increased. Alternatively, banks incurring losses and reductions in equity capital may choose to deleverage 
by selling loans in order to restore their equity ratio (see Adrian and Shin, 2010). We hypothesize that banks 
realizing larger losses during the crisis increased loan sales relative to other banks. This hypothesis follows 
naturally from an established theoretical and empirical literature analyzing the role of binding regulatory 
capital requirements on loan sales and, more generally, credit risk transfer (e.g., Allen and Carletti, 2006; 
Pennacchi, 1988). 
Table 3.10 presents the results.  Panel A shows the impact of measures of loan losses on loan sales, as 
well as banks’ total participation in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) during the crisis.  We include 
TARP participation as a measure of bank insolvency.33 These results provide a direct test of the hypothesis 
described above. We use two standard measures of loan losses. First, we consider the non-performing loans 
ratio, which measures the fraction of loans that have been classified as in default or close to being in default 
(e.g., 90 days past due). Second, we consider the net charge off ratio, which captures the fraction of assets 
that have been written off the balance sheet (net of recoveries). Some studies argue that the net charge offs 
measure is a more accurate indicator of losses, as it is more difficult to manipulate, however, banks can be 
                                                          
32 See Santos (2011) and references therein for a detailed discussion of losses incurred by U.S. commercial banks during  the 
subprime  crisis and  the impact of these losses on bank  lending  in the syndicated loan market. 
33 Data from banks’ participation in the TARP comes from the website of the United States Treasury Department at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/Pages/ default.aspx.   
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slow to write down loans which makes timing a potential issue.34 We include these loan loss variables 
measured in 2006:Q4 and also lagged values in a dynamic specification. Each specification includes the full 
sample of loan-lender-year observations and, as usual, includes controls for loan-year fixed effects and the 
full set of loan and bank controls.  
Columns [1] and [2] regress the loan sale variable on the non-performing loan ratio and the net charge 
offs ratio measure in 2006:Q4, respectively. Column [3] includes both ratios in the same regression model.  
In each case the loan loss variable is statistically insignificant. Column [4] adds TARP participation to the 
model. The coefficient on TARP is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that, for a given loan 
syndicate, banks with greater take up of TARP funds were more likely to exit their participation during the 
crisis. The magnitude of this effect is large: a one standard deviation increase in TARP participation 
(roughly, 0.01) is associated with a 2.2% increase in the probability of a loan sale, all else equal. 
Columns [5]–[8] repeat this exercise, but this time consider lagged values of non- performing loans 
and net charge offs (for a similar specification, see Santos, 2011). In each of these specifications, we 
see a positive and statistically significant relation between loan losses and loan sales.  The discrepancy 
between these two sets of specifications is likely due to a lack of variation in loan losses between 
banks at the onset of the crisis.  Put simply, most banks in the sample have close to zero values for 
both loan loss measures as of 2006:Q4. 
Panel B of Table 3.10 examines whether the effect of wholesale funding dependence on loan sales 
survives once we control for participation in TARP. These  tests are  designed  as an additional robustness 
check, as our benchmark estimation already  controls for bank  capital, non-performing  loans, and  net  
charge  offs (see Table  3.4). Columns [1] and [3] replicate the baseline estimation for our main and 
alternative measures of wholesale funding dependence, respectively. Columns [2] and [4] show the 
coefficients when we additionally control for TARP participation. Column [2] indicates that when we 
control for TARP the sign and statistical significance of wholesale funding remains unchanged. Column [4] 
                                                          
34 Beatty and Liao (2013) provide an extensive discussion of loan loss accounting and, more generally, financial accounting in the 
banking industry. 
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shows that our alternative measure of wholesale funding dependence remains the correct sign, but now 
becomes significant at the 5% level once we control for TARP participation. Overall, and taken together 
with the results from Table 3.4, these results indicate that the effect of wholesale funding dependence on 
loan sales that acts independently of credit risk considerations (e.g., bank insolvency concerns). 
Next, we examine how credit risk management and loan losses are associated with loan sales during the 
period before the crisis. Panel C of Table 3.10 presents the results. Column [1] examines the non-performing 
loan ratio for the period from 2003 until 2006. Columns [2] and [3] examines non-performing loans and net 
charge offs for the period 2004 until 2006.35 Each specification includes the full sample of loan-lender-year 
observations and, as usual, includes controls for loan-year fixed effects and the full set of loan and bank 
controls. Of particular interest is the bank capital ratio, which is included in all specifications. 
Overall, we find the loan loss variables, particularly, net charge offs, are strongly associated with loan 
sell offs during the period before the crisis (see also Table 3.3). Columns [1]–[3] also show that the capital 
ratio has strong predictive power for loan sales.  In each column, we find that the coefficient on the capital 
ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that a well-capitalized bank is 
less likely to sell a loan share, all else equal, during the period before the crisis. This finding corroborates 
the theory that binding regulatory capital requirements may induce banks to push credit risk off their balance 
sheets through loan sales.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This paper provides large-scale evidence on the supply-side determinants of syndicated bank loan sales.  
We take advantage of a comprehensive credit register of U.S. syndicated bank loans to track the dynamics 
                                                          
35 Data items required to calculate net charge offs only become available in 2003, which necessitates a different event windows for 
the present analysis. 
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of loan syndicates after origination. This allows us to pin down loan sales as well as control for shifts in 
credit demand at the loan-level using a loan-year fixed effects approach. 
We provide empirical evidence of a bank liquidity risk management motivation for loan sales. We 
examine how banks’ exposure to liquidity risk during the financial crisis (i.e., wholesale funding 
dependence) affected their decision to sell shares of syndicated loans. We provide direct evidence that, 
conditional on the market-wide liquidity shock, banks with a greater reliance on wholesale funding sold 
more loan shares and argue that these banks did so to preserve liquidity. Moreover, these effects are not  
present in the period from 2003 until 2006—a time when bank funding markets were well-functioning—
and persist when we account for banks’ solvency position, as measured by capital constraints and loan 
losses. 
In recent times, commercial banks have increasingly turned to wholesale funding sources. Although 
access to wholesale funding may be advantageous, it can also make banks more susceptible to funding 
shocks. Our paper provides evidence that wholesale funding reliant banks may have been able to partially 
smooth out funding shocks using the secondary loan market. However, the empirical evidence in the 
literature indicates that the drying  up  of liquidity in the recent crisis did ultimately cause banks to hoard  
liquidity—often by turning to lender of last resort facilities from the central bank and the government—and 
these funding shocks were transmitted to the real economy. Thus, more research is required to further our 
understanding of the use of wholesale funding by financial intermediaries and its implications for financial 
stability. 
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3.6 Figures 
Figure 3.1: Loan Shares Sold (in millions $, 1994-2010). Total number (left  axis) and  value in millions 
of dollars (right axis) of shares  of U.S. syndicated loan commitments (including term loans and lines of 
credit) registered with the Shared National Credit Program that were sold in the secondary market by U.S. 
bank  holding companies  during  the period from 1994 until 2010. A loan share is a fraction of a syndicated 
loan commitment. A loan share sale occurs when a U.S. bank holding company ceases to own a loan share 
relative to the previous year. 
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Figure 3.2: Loan Shares Sold (% of total loan commitments outstanding, 1995-2010). Fraction of 
the (lagged) total number  of shares (left axis) and fraction of the (lagged) total dollar value (right axis) 
of shares of U.S. syndicated loan commitments (including  term loans and lines of credit) registered 
with the Shared National Credit Program that were sold in the secondary  market by U.S. bank  holding 
companies during the period from 1995 until 2010. A loan share is a fraction of a syndicated loan 
commitment. A loan share sale occurs when a U.S. bank holding company ceases to own a loan share 
relative to the previous year. 
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Figure 3.3:  Loan Shares Sold (“pure sales,” 1994-2010). Total number of sales (left axis)  and  pure 
sales (right axis) of shares of U.S. syndicated loan commitments (including term loans and lines of 
credit) registered with the Shared National Credit Program that were sold in the secondary  market by 
U.S. bank  holding companies  during  the period from 1994 until 2010. A pure sale is defined as a loan 
sale that occurs without any coincident change in a term (e.g., maturity) of the underlying contract. A 
loan share is a fraction of a syndicated loan commitment. A loan share sale occurs when a U.S. bank 
holding company ceases to own a loan share relative to the previous year. 
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Figure 3.4: TED Spread (in %, 2002-2010). The difference between the three month LIBOR and the 
three month Treasury bill interest rate for the period from 2002 until 2010. 
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Table 3.3: Loan Sales and Bank Liquidity Risk Management During 2003-2006. The regressions in 
this table examine the impact of wholesale funding dependency and liquidity risk management on bank 
loan sales before the crisis period. The unit of observation in each regression is a loan-bank-year triple. 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a lender exits a loan syndicate that it was 
present in during the previous year. Column [1] includes the full sample. Column [2] restricts the sample 
to loan syndicates with fewer than 250 participants. Column [3] restricts the sample to loan years where 
no contract amendment or refinancing took place during the year. Column [4] measures Wholesale 
Funding using the time-averaged data for 2002 data. Column [5] uses time-varying (lagged) Wholesale 
Funding. Column [6] uses Total Deposits measured as of 2002Q4 as an alternative measure of wholesale 
funding dependency. All columns include controls for loan-year fixed effects. All variables are defined 
in Appendix B. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the loan level.  ***, **, * denotes 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
Dependent Variable:  Loan Salet 
  
 
 
 
     
 All <250 Lenders No Amend 2002 Avg. 
Dynamic 
Spec. 
Deposits 
2002Q4 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Wholesale Funding2002Q4 -0.037** -0.037** -0.011 -0.036** -0.059*** 0.024 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) 
NPL Ratiot-1 0.127 0.238 0.008 0.638** 0.118 0.062 
 (0.274) (0.273) (0.253) (0.264) (0.272) (0.276) 
Real Estate Loan Sharet-1 -0.023* -0.016 -0.026** -0.014 -0.021** -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -1.071*** -1.096*** -0.630*** -1.126*** -1.183*** -1.007*** 
 (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.136) (0.120) (0.118) 
Bank Sizet-1 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large Bankt-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Bank Mergert -0.016* -0.012 0.000 -0.016* -0.019** -0.015 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Bank Mergert-1 0.204*** 0.207*** 0.012 0.208*** 0.185*** 0.205*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) 
Agent Bankt-1 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.001 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Loan Fraction Heldt-1 -0.172*** -0.168*** -0.062*** -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.169*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
Loan-Year  fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 66,267 65,822 38,621 66,267 67,647 66,320 
# Loans 9,612 9,575 7,194 9,612 9,627 9,612 
R2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
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Table 3.4: Loan Sales and Bank Liquidity Risk Management During 2007-2010. The regressions in 
this table examine the impact of wholesale funding dependency at the onset of the crisis on bank loan sales 
during the crisis period. The unit of observation in each regression is a loan-bank-year triple. The dependent 
variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a lender exits a loan syndicate that it was present in during 
the previous year. Wholesale Funding is measured as of 2006Q4. All columns include controls for loan-
year fixed effects. Column [1] includes the full sample. Column [2] restricts the sample to loan syndicates 
with fewer than 250 participants. Column [3] restricts the sample to loan years where no contract 
amendment or refinancing took place during the year. Column [4] measures Wholesale Funding using the 
time-averaged data for 2006 data. Column [5] uses time-varying (lagged) Wholesale Funding. Column [6] 
uses Total Deposits measured as of 2006Q4 as an alternative measure of wholesale funding dependency. 
All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the loan level. 
***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
Dependent Variable: Loan Salet 
 
     
 All <250 Lenders No Amend 2006 Avg. 
Dynamic 
Spec. 
Deposit 
2006Q4 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Wholesale Funding2006Q4 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.066*** 0.057*** 0.103*** -0.020 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Net Charge  Offst-1 23.64*** 23.74*** 5.135* 36.94*** 25.18*** 21.04*** 
 (3.121) (3.147) (2.817) (6.035) (2.941) (2.921) 
NPL Ratiot- 1 0.317** 0.205 0.362** 0.807*** 0.305** 0.262* 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.143) (0.188) (0.128) (0.139) 
Real Estate Loan Sharet- 1 -0.031** -0.032** -0.057*** -0.027** -0.015 -0.042*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
Capital Ratiot - 1 0.172* 0.086 0.115 0.063 0.224*** 0.063 
 (0.091) (0.089) (0.097) (0.089) (0.075) (0.076) 
Bank Sizet- 1 0.004** 0.003** 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Large Bankt- 1 -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.042*** -0.056*** -0.064*** -0.069*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Bank Mergert -0.021** -0.005 -0.012 -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Bank Mergert-1 0.145*** 0.153*** 0.047*** 0.158*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Agent Bankt-1 -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.006** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Loan Fraction Heldt-1 -0.181*** -0.173*** -0.078*** -0.180*** -0.172*** -0.185*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Loan-Year  fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 76,621 73,045 46,210 76,625 81,011 79,766 
# Loans 9,564 9,301 7,409 9,564 9,599 9,585 
R2 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.41 
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Table 3.8: Dynamics of Bank Liquidity Risk Management During 2007-2010. The regressions in this 
table examine the impact of wholesale funding dependency at the onset of the crisis on bank loan sales 
during the crisis period on a year by year basis. Panel A examines this relationship excluding Liquid Assets. 
Panel B repeats this analysis including Liquid Assets. The unit of observation in each regression is a loan-
bank-year triple. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a lender exits a loan 
syndicate that it was present in during the previous year. Wholesale Funding is measured as of 2006Q4. 
Liquid Assets is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total bank assets. All columns include 
controls for loan-year fixed effects, bank controls, and loan controls (defined in Table 3.7). Columns [1]-
[5] use different event windows. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at the loan level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
Panel A: Excluding Liquid Assets 
Dependent Variable:  Loan Salet 
 
 
2007-2010 
 
[1] 
2007 
 
[2] 
2008 
 
[3] 
2009 
 
[4] 
2010 
 
[5] 
Wholesale  Funding2006Q4 0.076*** 0.048* 0.181*** -0.016 0.097*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) 
Bank  controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan-Year  fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
N 9,564 4,893 4,558 5,634 3,790 
# Loans 76,621 19,856 16,895 23,051 16,819 
R2 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.45 
 
Panel B:  Including Liquid Assets 
Dependent Variable:  Loan Salet 
 
 
2007-2010 
 
[1] 
2007 
 
[2] 
2008 
 
[3] 
2009 
 
[4] 
2010 
 
[5] 
Wholesale  Funding2006Q4 0.101*** 0.081** 0.299*** 0.047 0.056 
 (0.019) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.040) 
Liquid Assets2006Q4 -0.053*** 
(0.020) 
-0.068* 
(0.036) 
-0.099** 
(0.045) 
-0.126*** 
(0.042) 
0.0951** 
(0.045) 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan-Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
N 9,564 4,893 4,558 5,634 3,790 
# Loans 76,621 19,856 16,895 23,051 16,819 
R2 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.45 
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Table 3.9: Additional Specification Tests. The regressions in this table conduct a number of specification 
tests to examine the impact of wholesale funding dependency on bank loan sales. Panel A ranks banks’ 
wholesale funding dependence as of the onset of the financial crisis, instead of using the ratio of wholesale 
funds to total bank assets as an independent variable. A high, medium, or low exposure bank falls into the 
upper, middle, or lower tercile of the wholesale funding dependence distribution as of 2006:Q4. The low 
exposure banks are the omitted group in the regression. Panel B redefines the loan sale variable to include 
partial loan sales, which are identified as any reduction in loan share size. Panel C additionally controls for 
bank fixed effects and also uses the TED Spread as a continuous measure of stress in wholesale funding 
markets. The TED Spread is defined as the yearly average of the daily difference between the three month 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the three month U.S. Treasury rate. Wholesale funding 
dependence is measured as of 2002:Q4. Panel D measures all bank characteristics as of 2006:Q4. The unit 
of observation in each regression is a loan-bank-year triple. The dependent variable is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a lender exits a loan syndicate that it was present in during the previous year. All columns 
include bank and loan controls as well as controls for loan-year fixed effects. All variables are defined in 
Appendix B. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the loan level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, 
and 10% statistical significance. 
Panel A:  Ranked Wholesale Funding Dependence 
Dependent Variable:  Loan Salet 
 
All <250 Lenders No Amend 2006Avg. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Medium  Exposure2006Q4 0.008** 0.003 0.005 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
High Exposure2006Q4 0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan-Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
N 76,621 73,045 46,210 76,621 
# Loans 9,564 9,301 7,409 9,564 
R2 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.42 
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Table 3.9 (cont.) 
 
Panel B:  Inclusion of Partial Loan Sales  
Dependent Variable:  Loan Share Decreaset 
 
All <250 Lenders 
No 
Amend 
2006 
Avg. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Wholesale  Funding2006Q4 0.089***  0.096*** 0.091*** 0.063*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan-Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
N 76,621 73,045 46,210 76,625 
# Loans 9,564 9,301 7,409 9,564 
R2 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.42 
 
Panel C:  Bank Fixed Effects and TED Spread 
Dependent Variable: Loan Salet 
 All  
[1] 
All 
 
[2] 
All 
 
[3] 
All 
 
[4] 
All 
 
[5] 
Wholesale  Funding2002Q4 0.110*** -0.001  -0.020  
 (0.016) (0.012)  (0.015)  
Wholesale  Funding2002Q4 × Crisist  0.097*** 
(0.016) 
0.104*** 
(0.016) 
  
Wholesale  Funding2002Q4  × TEDt    0.099*** 
(0.018) 
0.100*** 
(0.019) 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank fixed effects N N Y N Y 
Loan-Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
N 71,829 138,096 138,096 138,096 138,096 
# Loans 9,564 16,318 16,318 16,318 16,318 
R2 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.44 
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Table 3.9 (cont.) 
Panel D: Alternative Timing for Measurement of Bank Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Loan Salet 
 
All <250 Lenders 
No 
Amend 
2006 
Avg. 
Deposits 
2006Q4 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Wholesale Funding2006Q4 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.068*** 0.039*** -0.020* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) 
Net Charge Offs2006Q4 -15.900 4.005 -2.215 -32.290 5.440 
 (12.910) (12.500) (11.690) (19.860) (11.700) 
NPL Ratio2006Q4 0.310 0.516* -0.395 0.161 0.389 
 (0.291) (0.289) (0.297) (0.423) (0.276) 
Real Estate Loan Share2006Q4 -0.004 -0.010 -0.038*** -0.016 -0.026* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Capital Ratio2006Q4 0.210* 0.058 0.152 0.079 -0.076 
 (0.115) (0.111) (0.122) (0.104) (0.086) 
Bank Size2006Q4 0.003** 0.003* 0.001 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Large Bank2006Q4 -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.034*** -0.050*** -0.045*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Bank Mergert -0.019** -0.005 -0.011 -0.0184** -0.021** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Bank Mergert-1 0.178***  0.188*** 
 
0.054*** 
 
0.178*** 
 
0.171*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Agent Bankt-1 -0.017*** -0.015*** 
 
-0.006** 
 
-0.017*** 
 
-0.017*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Loan Fraction Heldt-1 -0.189*** -0.183*** -0.082*** -0.188*** -0.189*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) 
Loan-Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
N 9,564 9,301 7,409 9,564 9,585 
# Loans 76,621 73,045 46,210 76,621 79,766 
R2 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.41 
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Table 3.10 (cont.) 
Panel B: TARP and Liquidity Risk Management  
Dependent Variable: Loan Salet 
 All 
[1] 
All 
[2] 
All 
[3] 
All 
[4] 
Wholesale Funding2006Q4 0.076*** 0.073***   
 (0.013) (0.013)   
Total  Deposits2006Q4   -0.020 -0.027** 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
TARP/Assetst-1  1.776***   1.919*** 
  (0.257)  (0.255) 
Bank controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan-Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
N 76,621 76,621 79,766 79,766 
# Loans 9,564 9,564 9,585 9,585 
R2 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.42 
 
Panel C: Losses and Loan Sales During 2003-2006 
Dependent Variable: Loan Salet 
 2003-2006 2004-2006 
 All [1] 
All 
[2] 
All 
[3] 
NPL Ratio2002Q4  
 
1.401***    
 (0.246)   
NPL Ratio2003Q4    -0.747** 
    (0.309) 
Net Charge Offs2003Q4   154.5*** 156.2*** 
   (54.88) (54.63) 
Real Estate Loan Sharet-1  0.018 -0.024* -0.032** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Capital Ratiot-1  -0.877***  -1.557***  -1.587***  
  (0.120) (0.154) (0.155) 
Bank Sizet-1  -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large Bankt-1  0.006 0.008 0.008 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Bank merger controls  Y Y Y 
Loan controls  Y Y Y 
Loan-Year  fixed effects  Y Y Y 
N  66,320 47,758 47,758 
# Loans  9,612 7,286 7,286 
R2  0.36 0.35 0.35 
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Appendix A 
Description of Shareholder Proposals in chapter 1. 
Type Description Proposal N 
Average 
Vote 
Outcome 
Discontinuity 
#-2,+2 #-5,+5 #-10,+10 
Audit  35 2.9% 0 1 1 
 Rotate auditors 1 0.0% 0 0 0 
 limit consulting by auditors 31 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Shareholder approval of auditor 3 33.3% 0 1 1 
Board  383 3.4% 13 26 63 
 Commit to/report on board diversity 10 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Increase audit committee Independence 2 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Increase key committee Independence 13 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Lead director 5 0.0% 0 0 1 
 Limit director tenure 25 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Miscellanea 68 2.9% 4 8 12 
 Separate chairman/CEO 222 4.1% 8 14 44 
 Allow union/employee reps on the board 2 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Create nominating committee 1 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Increase compensation committee independence 5 20.0% 1 2 3 
 Independent nominating committee 4 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Majority of independent directors 26 3.8% 0 2 3 
Compensation  923 10.4% 54 132 257 
 Add performance criteria to equity-based awards 27 14.8% 2 5 10 
 Advisory vote on compensation 185 18.4% 30 71 129 
 Approve/disclose/limit SERPs 28 14.3% 3 5 11 
 Expense stock options 69 60.9% 13 26 43 
 Cap executive pay 23 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Disclose executive compensation 37 0.0% 1 1 3 
 Hire independent compensation consultant 3 0.0% 0 2 2 
 Link executive pay to social criteria 63 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Misc compensation 38 5.3% 1 3 8 
 Pension fund surplus reporting 15 6.7% 0 1 6 
 Require equity awards to be held 41 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Restrict director compensation 14 0.0% 0 0 0 
 Approve executive compensation 2 50.0% 0 0 1 
 Cap executive pay 285 2.1% 2 12 25 
 No re-pricing underwater stock options 3 0.0% 0 1 1 
 Pay directors in stock 2 0.0% 0 0 0 
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Appendix A (cont.) 
Type Description Proposal N 
Average 
Vote 
Outcome 
Discontinuity 
#-2,+2 #-5,+5 #-10,+10 
Other  211 10.90% 11 23 39 
 Double board nominees 26 0.00% 0 0 0 
 Miscellanea 133 15.80% 11 23 36 
 Opt out of state takeover statute 1 100.00% 0 0 1 
 Reincorporate to U.S. state 27 3.70% 0 0 2 
 Restore preemptive rights 1 0.00% 0 0 0 
 Change annual meeting date 1 0.00% 0 0 0 
 Change annual meeting location 8 0.00% 0 0 0 
 Study sale of company 14 0.00% 0 0 0 
Voting  228 40.80% 32 72 130 
 Equal access to proxy 4 0.00% 0 1 2 
 Majority vote to elect directors 223 41.70% 32 71 128 
 No discretionary voting 1 0.00% 0 0 0 
G-Index  949 58.20% 60 134 288 
G-Delay Shareholders may call special meeting 129 38.80% 16 36 73 
G-Delay Repeal classified board 239 89.10% 9 24 62 
G-Other Remove antitakeover provisions & other 23 13.00% 0 0 1 
G-Other Adopt anti-greenmail provision 3 33.30% 0 0 1 
G-Other Redeem or vote on poison pill 155 73.50% 15 28 45 
G-Protection Maximum director liability 2 0.00% 0 0 0 
G-Protection Vote on future golden parachutes 115 50.40% 8 21 47 
G-Voting Adopt cumulative voting 159 3.80% 6 12 32 
G-Voting Confidential voting 2 100.00% 0 0 0 
G-Voting Eliminate supermajority provision 114 86.00% 6 13 27 
G-Voting Require only majority vote 8 87.50% 0 0 0 
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Appendix B 
Variable Definitions: This appendix presents the definitions for the variables used throughout the chapter 
3. 
Panel A:  Loan Level Variables  
 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
Loan Sale Indicator variable equal to one if bank exits syndicate that it 
participated in last year that continues to exist in the current year. 
SNC 
Loan Share Decrease 
 
Indicator variable equal to one if bank decreases share of syndicate 
that it participated in last year that continues to exist in the current 
year. 
 
SNC 
Agent Dummy Indicator variable equal to one if SNC identifies lender as 
administrative agent. 
SNC 
Loan Fraction Held Fraction of total outstanding loan commitment held by syndicate 
member. 
SNC 
Panel B:  Bank Level Variables  
Variable Definition Source 
Wholesale  Funding 
 
 
Sum of large time deposits, foreign deposits, repo sold, other borrowed 
money, subordinated debt, and fed funds purchased divided by total 
assets. 
 
Y-9C 
 
 
Total Deposits Total deposits divided by total assets. Y-9C 
Liquid Assets 
 
Sum of cash, fed funds sold, repo bought, and securities (excluding 
mortgage-and asset-backed securities) divided by total assets. 
Y-9C 
 
NPL Ratio Non-performing loans divided by total loans. Y-9C 
Net Charge  Offs 
 
Charge offs net of recoveries divided by total assets. 
 
Y-9C 
 Real Estate Loan Share 
 
Real estate loans divided by total loans. Y-9C 
 Capital Ratio Book capital divided by total assets. 
 
Y-9C 
 Bank  Size Natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Y-9C 
 Large Bank 
 
Indicator variable equal to one if total assets greater than $50bn. 
 
Y-9C 
 Merger Dummy 
 
Indicator variable equal to one if lender top holder ID changes in 
current year. 
 
SNC 
 
TARP/Assets 
 
 
` 
Funds extended under Troubled Asset Relief Program divided by total 
assets. 
Treasury 
 
 
